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I.

I NTRODUCTION

Two of the biggest environmental—and energy—stories of
this decade are the resurgence of natural gas due to the shale gas
boom and the Obama administration’s decision to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions from power plants under the Clean
Power Plan. Each of these stories, on its own, is worth significant
attention. Even more important, they are connected.
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, James I. Farr Professor of Law, and
Presidential Scholar, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah. We
express our appreciation to Arnold Reitze for his helpful comments on an
earlier draft. This research was made possible in part through generous
support from the Albert and Elaine Borchard Fund for Faculty Excellence, as
well as the University of Utah’s Presidential Scholar program.
** Quinney Research Fellow, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of
Utah.
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Since at least the 1960s, it has been clear that energy and
environmental issues are deeply intertwined. 1 Today, climate
change makes that even more plain, and the question of how the
nation produces electricity is the pinnacle of that problem.
Electricity generation is the leading source of greenhouse gas
emissions in the United States. Thus, if the nation is serious about
a global solution for climate change, reducing emissions from the
electricity sector is non-negotiable.
Both natural gas and the Clean Power Plan offer possible
solutions to reducing greenhouse gas emissions from electricity.
Natural gas is a cleaner burning fuel than coal, the leading energy
source for electricity generation today, and it also produces
significantly lower CO2 emissions than coal. The Clean Power Plan
compels states to reduce CO2 emissions from their electricity
generation fleets, and it affords them flexibility to determine how
to do so.
Thus, not only are the stories of natural gas and the Clean
Power Plan connected, it is quite possible that natural gas and the
Plan may work together to help the United States lower its
greenhouse gas emissions profile. 2 In fact, use of natural gas for
electricity production was already on the rise, in large part
because its price has declined as greater supplies have been made
available.
Now, the Clean Power Plan has put an even brighter spotlight
on natural gas. Indeed, for years, observers have argued that
natural gas could act as a “bridge” fuel to a clean energy economy,
simultaneously fostering energy independence and facilitating a
transition to greater reliance on renewables and other low carbon
energy sources. It is hardly surprising, then, that many assume
the Clean Power Plan seeks to do just that—utilize natural gas as
a bridge to a lower carbon economy. Whether the Clean Power
Plan will reshape the nation’s electricity sector depends, of course,
on whether it can survive legal challenge in the courts, a fact
underscored by the Supreme Court’s recent issuance of a stay of

1. Despite this, energy law and environmental law have remained largely
separate fields, and a key challenge to solving climate change and other
problems that arise at the connection of energy use and environmental
degradation depends on better coordinating these fields. See generally, e.g.,
Lincoln L. Davies, Alternative Energy and the Energy-Environment
Disconnect, 46 IDAHO L. REV . 473 (2010); Alexandra B. Klass, Climate Change
and the Convergence of Environmental and Energy Law , 24 FORDHAM ENVTL.
L. REV . 180 (2013); Amy J. Wildermuth, Is Environmental Law a Barrier to
Emerging Alternative Energy Sources? 46 IDAHO L. REV . 509 (2010); Amy J.
Wildermuth, The Next Step: The Integration of Energy Law and
Environmental Law, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV . 369 (2011).
2. The counterpoint, of course, is that natural gas, particularly through
leaks, can exacerbate climate change by releasing methane, a far more potent
greenhouse gas than CO 2, into the atmosphere. See infra Part IV.B.
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the rule. 3 Nonetheless, the Clean Power Plan is momentous
enough that the inquiry carries merit even as the Plan’s legal
basis remains under attack.
This article explores the role of natural gas in the Clean
Power Plan. It asks whether and how natural gas will be used
under the Plan. In doing so, the article highlights that the
relationship between natural gas and the Plan is almost certain to
be more complex than it would at first seem. Whether gas will
serve as a bridge to a clean energy future is a complicated enough
question, and prognosticating how states may use gas to satisfy
the Plan’s mandate is an even more intricate and multifaceted
endeavor. Many factors are likely to impact gas’s role under the
Clean Power Plan, including its price, the price of competing fuels,
geography, and states’ adoption of (or failure to adopt) energy
efficiency measures. Energy system models give some insight into
these issues, and they suggest that natural gas’s role in U.S.
electricity production will increase initially under the Plan but
either level off or decline as the rule’s 2030 compliance date
approaches. Gas, then, may serve as a bridge to some degree under
the Clean Power Plan, but big questions about that bridge’s
length, width, and shape remain.
This article proceeds in five parts. Part II provides a broader
context for understanding natural gas’s role in society today by
tracing its role through history. Part III surveys various models
that have estimated what impact the Clean Power Plan may have
on the gas industry, and how gas may be used to help states
achieve compliance with the Plan. Part IV explores two competing
metaphors that have been offered to describe the role of gas in the
future—a “bridge” and a “dead end”—and then uses those
analogies as lenses to explore how the role of natural gas under
the Clean Power Plan might be assessed. Part V concludes that
even if the Clean Power Plan survives judicial scrutiny, it will not
be the only influence shaping the role of natural gas in the future.

II. A BRIEF HISTORY: THE ROLE OF NATURAL GAS IN THE
UNITED STATES
Natural gas is one of the most important energy resources in
the world today. Internationally, it both divides and binds nations
together, as made clear, respectively, by many European countries’
tenuous relationship with Russia as a gas supplier,4 as well as by
the extensive movement of gas among nations across borders,

3. Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 999 (2016).
4. Justin Clune, The Natural Gas Trade Between the Russian Federation
and the European Union: Power Dynamics, Legal Challenges, and a Country
Caught in the Middle, 35 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS . 199, 202–03 (2014).
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oceans, and continents. 5 In the United States, natural gas has long
dominated the residential and commercial heating sectors, has
become one of the most crucial fuels for electricity generation, and
remains a central industrial input. 6
In this way, natural gas is both remarkable and unique. It is
more nimble and, because of that, arguably more influential than
any other single energy resource. Unlike many primary energy
resources, it is not tied to a single industry, such as coal is for
electricity production or oil is for transportation. 7 And unlike other
resources, like nuclear, which has provided roughly a fifth of U.S.
electricity production for almost two straight decades but appears
poised to lose that position if more investment in the technology is
not made, 8 natural gas’s importance seems only to be growing.
Indeed, natural gas plays a critical role in all three of the United
States’ secondary energy systems: electricity, heating, and
transport. Other energy sources cannot make that claim.
Natural gas also occupies a commanding role in the modern
energy-environment discourse. From a climate perspective,
policymakers and others point to natural gas as a potential
“bridge” fuel from the world’s current fossil fuel system to a
possible clean energy economy of the future. 9 At the same time,
many environmentalists and others push against natural gas
use—in large part because of perceived and real water quality,
wildlife, and local land use risks from the insurgent practice of
horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing, 10 but also because of

5. Major international natural gas movement occurs predominantly
between Europe, Asia, and Africa. See BP, BP STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD
ENERGY 29 (2015). Liquefied natural gas movement occurs between South
America and Europe, while major natural gas movement in North America
occurs via pipelines. Id.
6. Electricity generation comprises the largest share of natural gas use in
the United States, constituting 30 percent of total co nsumption. U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN., Natural Gas Consumption by End Use, www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng
_cons_sum_dcu_nus_a.htm (last updated Feb. 29, 2016). Industrial use
constitutes the second-highest use at 28 percent, followed by residential use at
19 percent. Id.
7. Electricity production accounts for 93 percent of coal consumption in the
United States. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., Q UARTERLY COAL REPORT, APRIL–
JUNE 2014 (2014), www.eia.gov/coal/production/quarterly/pdf/t32p01p1.pdf.
Transportation accounts for 71 percent of oil consumption in the United
States. Ethan Fawley, Energy 101: Oil, FRESH ENERGY (NOV . 21, 2011),
http://fresh-energy.org/2011/11/energy-101-oil/.
8. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., January 2016 Monthly Energy Review,
110 tbl. 7.2b (Jan. 27, 2016), www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/archive
/00351601.pdf. In 1988, nuclear accounted for 19.5 percent of U.S. electricity
generation; in 2014, that figure was 20.2 percent.
9. See infra Part IV.A.
10. Craig Segall, SIERRA CLUB, Look Before the LNG Leap: Why
Policymakers and the Public Need Fair Disclosure Before Exports of Fracked
Gas Start 1 (2012); Sharron Kelly, Environment: The Trouble with Fracking,
NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION (Sept. 15, 2011), www.nwf.org/News-and-
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near- and long-term climate risks from relying on the fuel. 11 In
both cases, natural gas holds great sway in both the public
consciousness and the imaginations of those who think deeply
about energy policy, transformation, and governance.
Natural gas did not always hold such prominence. Indeed, its
centrality in the United States’ modern energy system bears little
relationship to its former history. Natural gas’s early role in
modernity was as little more than an afterthought—a curious
happenstance used occasionally by farmers or sometimes in cities
for lighting but hardly the raging force it is today, both central and
dominant at once. It took many years, decades really, for natural
gas to catch on, and when it did, it was largely for industrial
processes and domestic and commercial heating use. 12 The fuel’s
centrality to the energy economy is truly a modern phenomenon, a
trend beginning in earnest in the lead up to and after World War
II and reaching full force only as the century turned.
The history of natural gas is an amalgam of fascinating
vignettes, technological change, competition, and legal-political
intrigue. It is a rich history, and one that is often told from the
vantage of how law and regulation hindered, and then severely
disrupted, markets for this valuable resource. 13 That perspective is
undeniably important, and a critical part of the story, but it is also
useful to pull the lens farther back to see the role of natural gas in
a broader context.
From a historical perspective, natural gas’s role in society can
be categorized into five key periods: (1) its nascent, minor, and
opportunistic use for lighting, a period in which it largely lost out
to town gas and kerosene, and then electricity, as a source of
illumination; (2) its role as a nuisance byproduct of oil and coal
extraction that was largely burned off as waste; (3) its growing use
for home and commercial heating and appliance use, as well as an
industrial feedstock, leading up to World War II, made possible in
large part by key developments in steel, welding, and pipeline
technology; (4) its tumultuous years as an unreliable and
unpredictable resource that caused and was part of economic
disruptions, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s; and (5) its
expanding role as a fuel for electricity production, driven in no
small part by the rise of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal
drilling technology that have unlocked shale gas resources.

Magazines/National-Wildlife/Animals/Archives/2011/Trouble-with-Fracking
.aspx; Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, 21
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 229, 242–48 (2010).
11. See infra Part IV.B.
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. See generally, e.g., PAUL W. MACAVOY, THE NATURAL G AS MARKET:
SIXTY YEARS OF REGULATION AND DEREGULATION (2000).
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The remainder of this Part briefly surveys the history of
natural gas in the United States by examining each of these roles
played by natural gas in society over time.

A. Early Light: Natural Gas in the Shadows
The early history of natural gas in the United States is
humble indeed. There are, of course, ancient stories of natural gas
use, from Ming Dynasty texts describing gas’s extraction from the
earth using long bamboo tubes and storage in pig bladders to
provide light, 14 to the construction of an ancient Greek temple on
Mount Parnassus “over an ignited natural gas leak” found by a
sheepherder around 1000 B.C. to house the Oracle of Delphi and
that priestess’s eternal flame. 15 Still, reliance on natural gas in the
United States—the “birthplace of the natural gas industry”—came
much later. 16
French explorers observed Native Americans igniting gas
seepages near Lake Erie as early as 1626, 17 but it was not until
1821 that natural gas was put to practical use. In that year, in
Fredonia, New York, young boys accidentally ignited a seepage of
natural gas while throwing flaming sticks across the Canadaway
Creek. 18 Following this discovery, townspeople drilled a 27-footdeep well and piped the gas using small hollowed-out logs to
several nearby homes, which burned the gas to provide light.19
Subsequently, William Hart, a local gunsmith, replaced the logs
with a quarter-inch lead pipe he had made to transport the gas to
Abel House, a local inn that also used the gas for illumination. 20
Another key contribution of Hart’s was the “gasometer,” an

14. LINCOLN L. DAVIES ET AL., ENERGY LAW AND POLICY 100 (2014);
BARBARA FREESE , COAL: A HUMAN HISTORY (2003).
15. DAVIES ET AL., supra note 14, at 101; see also MALCOLM W. H. PEEBLES ,
EVOLUTION OF THE G AS INDUSTRY 5 (1980) (describing other ancient natural
gas use); LOUIS STOTZ & ALEXANDER JAMISON, HISTORY OF THE G AS INDUSTRY
68 (1938) (“Natural gas was known in Biblical days, and in the region of the
Caspian sea eternal fires of natural gas were worshipped long before the
Christian era. In Japan, gas wells were known as early [as] 615 A.D . . .”).
16. PEEBLES , supra note 15, at 51; cf. STOTZ & JAMISON, supra note 15, at
68 (“At an early date, the City of Genoa, Italy, was lighted by gas brought from
the nearby wells of Anniamo, in Parma. This was probably the first
commercial use of natural gas in the Western World.”).
17. American Public Gas Association, A Brief History of Natural Gas,
www.apga.org/apgamainsite/aboutus/facts/history-of-natural-gas (last visited
Feb. 3, 2016); see also STOTZ & JAMISON, supra note 15, at 69 (noting that
natural gas was also detected in springs in West Virginia in 1775, again in a
salt well in 1815, and on the south bank of the Ohio River in Pittsburgh in
1820).
18. PEEBLES , supra note 15, at 51. But cf. STOTZ & JAMISON, supra note 15,
at 69 (stating that this discovery was in 1824).
19. PEEBLES , supra note 15, at 51.
20. Id. at 51–52.
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“inverted water-filled vat” that could hold the gas for
distribution. 21 By 1825, using the gasometer, Fredonia had added
66 gas lights, while Fredonia’s newspaper bragged that the town
had enough gas for over 300 more lights—a gas supply
“‘unparalleled on the face of the globe.”22
Despite its pioneering efforts, Fredonia’s application of
natural gas for lighting proved less than a harbinger. Other cities
did not adopt natural gas an energy resource. Still, Fredonia’s
decision to use natural gas for lighting was emblematic of the
larger economic environment into which the fuel was introduced.
While today natural gas is an extraordinarily flexible fuel used in
many sectors of the economy, its chief purpose in the nineteenth
century was for lighting, 23 driven in part by the introduction of
various burners to improve illumination efficiency. 24 Available,
then, primarily as an alternative to other options for illumination,
natural gas languished in the shadows in these early years, beaten
out by more competitive fuels. 25
A fierce battle raged in the nineteenth century to satisfy a
burgeoning demand for lighting. That demand was growing in part
because of declining whale populations. “For those who had
money, oil from the sperm whale had for hundreds of years set the
standard for high-quality illumination; but even as demand was
growing, the whale schools of the Atlantic had been decimated . . .
.”26 Thus, as whale oil prices soared and demand for lighting grew,
energy entrepreneurs sought different ways to make light. An
early option was camphene, “a derivative of turpentine, which
produced a good light but had the unfortunate drawback of being
highly flammable, compounded by an even more unattractive
tendency to explode in people’s houses.” 27 So, eventually, industry
turned to other options.
It would not be until 1879 that Thomas Edison developed a
reliable incandescent lightbulb, 28 and in the meantime—and for
21. Id. at 52.
22. Id. (citation omitted).
23. See Connie C. Barlow, Coal Gasification in the 19th Century and the
Origins of the Gas-Distribution Business, in ARLON R. TUSSING & BOB TIPPEE ,
THE NATURAL G AS INDUSTRY: EVOLUTION, STRUCTURE , AND ECONOMICS 59,
59–61 (2d ed. 1995).
24. WILLIAM T. BRANNT, PETROLEUM : ITS HISTORY, O RIGIN, O CCURRENCE ,
PRODUCTION, PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL CONSTITUTION, TECHNOLOGY,
EXAMINATION AND USES ; TOGETHER WITH THE O CCURRENCE AND USES OF
NATURAL G AS 659–60 (Hans Hoefer and Alexander Veith, eds., 1895). So me
gas burners were also used for cooking.
25. While gas was used at this time primarily for lighting, at least one
company employed it for industrial purposes, namely, to evaporate brine in
salt manufacturing. STOTZ & JAMISON, supra note 15, at 70.
26. DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE : THE EPIC Q UEST FOR O IL, MONEY, AND
POWER 6 (2008).
27. Id. at 6–7.
28. E.g., RICHARD MUNSON, FROM EDISON TO ENRON: THE BUSINESS OF
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some time thereafter—three other energy sources dominated the
illumination market: candles, kerosene, and gas. 29 All shared
major drawbacks. “[T]hey produced soot, dirt, and heat; they
consumed oxygen; and there was always the danger of fire.” 30 It
was in part this last risk that ultimately gave electric lights such a
key advantage, but the fugacious and volatile nature of gas posed
another problem. Because natural gas was hard to capture and
harder still to transport, its use for lighting was largely limited to
localized properties where it was easily moved and readily
available. 31 Thus, where it was used, natural gas was primarily a
source for light.
The irony, however, was that natural gas played a rather
minor role in gas’s share of the lighting market. Rather, it was a
close cousin of natural gas—so-called “town gas,” which was
manufactured from coal (and other sources, such as pine tar) and
had a lower illumination value than natural gas—that became a
widespread source for light in U.S. cities. In fact, Baltimore, the
first city to use synthetic town gas, began doing so in 1816, five
years before natural gas was discovered in Fredonia. 32 By the end
of the nineteenth century, town gas had a wide grasp on the U.S.
illumination market, from New York, Boston, and Philadelphia on
the East Coast to San Francisco, Seattle, and Los Angeles on the
West Coast, from Detroit, St. Paul, and Chicago in the Midwest to
Atlanta, Norfolk, and New Orleans in the South. 33 Indeed,
although it is seldom discussed today, town gas maintained an
important position in the U.S. economy for decades after the
century ended, while natural gas struggled to find its niche. As
Louis Stotz and Alexander Jamison observed as late as 1938,
POWER AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE FUTURE OF ELECTRICITY 14–18 (2005);
see also The Quintessential Innovator, TIME, Oct. 22, 1979, http://content.time
.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,947523-1,00.html. For more on Edison,
see generally, e.g., PAUL ISRAEL, EDISON: A LIFE OF INVENTION (2000); JILL
JONNES , EMPIRES OF LIGHT (2003); MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, EDISON: A
BIOGRAPHY (1959); BLAINE MCCORMICK, AT WORK WITH THOMAS EDISON
(2001).
29. Paul Rutter & James Keirstead, A Brief History and the Possible
Future of Urban Energy Systems, 50 ENERGY POL’Y 72, 77 (2012).
30. YERGIN, supra note 26, at 62. Pressed by competition from gas and
electricity, kerosene effectively fell out of use for lighting by 1895. STOTZ &
JAMISON, supra note 15, at 8.
31. PEEBLES , supra note 15, at 54.
32. BARLOW, supra note 23, at 63. More sporadic uses of coal gasification
occurred in England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. See id. at
62.
33. Id. at 63. Baltimore began using town gas in 1816, and New York
followed seven years later. Other early adopters of gas for lighting included
Boston (1828), Louisville and New Orleans (1832), Philadelphia and
Pittsburgh (1836), Cincinnati (1840), St. Louis (1846), Newark (1847),
Providence and Washington, D.C. (1848), and Cleveland, Detroit, Norfolk, and
Syracuse (1849). By 1887, at least fifty U.S. cities were using gas lighting.
STOTZ & JAMISON, supra note 15, at 9–10.
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natural gas’s value “was always recognized, but there was either
too much or too little of it at a time; the pressure was variable,
there was no way to store it, and with coal and oil so cheap, the
economic incentive to overcome the difficulties in handling it was
lacking.”34

B. Byproduct: Nuisance and Flaring
At the same time some in the United States had begun using
natural gas opportunistically for lighting, the oil industry was
taking off. Edwin Drake’s discovery of Pennsylvania oil in 1859
prompted a rush to harvest crude wherever it could be found,
setting the stage for the all-too-common boom-and-bust cycle of
resource extraction that would play out again and again in U.S.
history, including for oil itself. 35
The clamor for oil was at first mostly about light—“new light,”
or the processing of crude into kerosene for illumination purposes.
While oil later became critical as a transport fuel, its use for
kerosene as a lighting source dominated its early years, driven in
part by international demand for this U.S. export. 36 Thus, from the
beginning, oil and natural gas were connected in at least two
ways: first, as alternates to each other for illumination, with oil
handily winning that match; and second, physically, because oil
and natural gas are often present together under the ground.
Throughout the nineteenth century and reaching well into the
twentieth, this latter connection proved most critical for natural
gas’s role in society. That it was often found alongside oil, but was
difficult to manipulate and control, relegated natural gas to status
largely as an unwanted byproduct: a nuisance. 37 Men on the prowl
for oil feared natural gas, because it was dangerous, flammable,
and explosive. 38 It was also hard to contain. Unlike oil, which
could be stored in anything that would hold it, including what
Drake first used—whiskey barrels39—natural gas escapes

34. STOTZ & JAMISON, supra note 15, at 71.
35. YERGIN, supra note 26, at 10–18.
36. Id. at 40–41.
37. Natural gas can be categorized in two key ways. First, natural gas can
be categorized according to its extraction method. Natural gas extraction
occurs either “conventionally” or “unconventionally,” or sometimes as coalbed
methane (CBM). Conventional natural gas refers to gas stored in permeable
reservoir rock formations. By contrast, unconventional natural gas—or “shale
gas”—is found in tight sand and shale formations. Coalbed methane, as its
name implies, is present in seams of coal reserves. Second, natural gas can be
categorized according to its relationship to oil. “Associated” natural gas refers
to gas that is found in the same reservoir as oil. “Non-associated” natural gas
refers to gas that is present in its own geologic formations, absent oil. DAVIES
ET AL., supra note 14, at 123, 629.
38. Barlow, supra note 23, at 59.
39. YERGIN, supra note 26, at 10–18.
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immediately upon release into the atmosphere because it is exactly
that, a gas. 40 Thus, even when those seeking oil wanted to take the
gas too, that was difficult to capture. Often, moreover, they had no
such desire. While, in many reservoirs, associated natural gas
provides the pressure that aids extraction of the crude, this was
not well known in the early years of oil development, so gas was
habitually treated as a barrier to acquiring the oil. 41
For all these reasons, common practice throughout the
nineteenth century was simply to vent or flare—that is, burn off—
natural gas when it was discovered. In fact, although much less
common now than then, the practice continues today, 42 made
perhaps most infamous by satellite images of the Bakken shale
region of North Dakota, which at night can appear as wide and
bright as any large metropolitan area of the United States. 43 For
the hydrocarbon pioneers of the nineteenth century, flaring was an
efficient and economical way to reduce the risk of oil extraction.
Despite this prevailing treatment of natural gas, the irony
that a very valuable resource was literally going up in flames
while companies in cities were manufacturing an inferior
replacement fuel at a much higher cost was not lost on everyone.
Some oil producers, looking to at least minimize the waste, sold
natural gas to nearby “carbon-black plants for mere pennies per
thousand cubic feet, while urban dwellers typically bought
manufactured gas at prices of a dollar or more.” 44 Lawmakers also
stepped into the gap. In regions where natural gas availability and
use were growing, such as Indiana and Texas, state legislatures
banned or limited the practice of flaring in an effort to reduce
waste. 45 At the same time, basic oil and gas law principles, such as
40. DAVIES ET AL., supra note 14, at 123.
41. Cf. Connie C. Barlow et al., From Manufactured to Natural Gas and
Emergence of the Gas-Transmission Industry, in TUSSING & TIPPEE , supra
note 23, at 79, 79–81; DENNIS O TIOTIO, G AS FLARING REGULATION IN THE O IL
AND G AS INDUSTRY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF NIGERIA AND TEXAS
REGULATIONS , at 10–11 (2013), www.academia.edu/3615407/GAS_FLARING_
REGULATION_IN_THE_OIL_AND_GAS_INDUSTRY_A_Comparative_Analy
sis_of_Nigeria_and_Texas_Regulations.
42. See, e.g., Natural Gas Flaring, Processing, and Transportation ,
UCSUSA.ORG, www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/our-energy-choices/coal-and-otherfossil-fuels/natural-gas-flaring-processing-transportation.html#.VqxPDY-cGM8
(last visited Feb. 3, 2016); Bjorn Hamso, Time to End Routine Gas Flaring,
WORLDBANK.ORG (July 7, 2014), www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/07/
15/gas-flaring-reduction-takes-center-stage-at-global-event.
43. Bobby Magill, North Dakota Gas Flaring Doubles, Pumping CO 2 Into
Air, CLIMATE CENTRAL (Mar. 21, 2014), www.climatecentral.org/news/northdakota-gas-flaring-doubles-pumping-co2-into-air-17212; see also U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN., North Dakota Aims to Reduce Natural Gas Flaring, (Oct. 20,
2014), www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=18451 (noting that roughly
one-third of natural gas recovered in North Dakota in recent years has been
flared rather than delivered to market).
44. Barlow et al., supra note 41, at 79 (emphasis omitted).
45. See State v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 809 (Ind. 1898); Tex. Acts 26th Leg.
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the rule of capture, incentivized flaring and other forms of gas
wastage because they promoted as rapid extraction of oil as
possible. 46
Thus, even as natural gas gained prominence as an energy
resource in the first and second quarters of the twentieth century,
it also maintained its role as a nuisance byproduct. In fact, as late
as 1949, more than ten percent of natural gas extracted in the
United States was vented or flared. 47 And, while that percentage
has declined precipitously since then, the gross amount of natural
gas vented and flared in the United States is higher today than it
has been since 1970, as shown in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1: Venting and Flaring of U.S. Natural Gas 48
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Reg. Session, 1899, Ch. 49, p.8. For more on the early development of state oil
and gas conservation regulation, see generally, e.g., A.B.A., SECTION OF
MINERAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW, CONSERVATION OF O IL & G AS: A
LEGAL HISTORY (Robert E. Sullivan, ed. (1958); A.B.A., SECTION OF MINERAL
LAW, LEGAL HISTORY OF CONSERVATION OF O IL AND G AS (1938).
46. David E. Pierce, Minimizing the Environmental Impact of Oil and Gas
Development by Maximizing Production Conservation , 85 N.D. L. REV . 759,
762–63 (2009).
47. This is according to data from the U.S. Energy Information
Administration. See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Natural Gas Gross
Withdrawals and Production (2016), www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_sum_dc_
nus_mmcf_a.htm.
48. See id.
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C. Emergence and Prominence: Appliances, Heating,
and the Rise of Pipelines
As the century turned, the natural gas industry faced both
obstacles and opportunities. The key obstacle was certainly
significant but also surmountable. Moving natural gas was
difficult, so pipeline technology needed to be improved for the
industry to mature. 49 The opportunities were equally plain.
Natural gas had many advantages over manufactured gas,
including that it did not risk asphyxiation because it lacked
“poisonous carbon monoxide,” “did not blight the atmosphere with
the soot and sulfur compounds that spewed out of [synthetic] gas
works,” and packed twice the energy punch per cubic foot as
manufactured gas. 50 Moreover, because use of manufactured town
gas had become quite prevalent, the groundwork was laid for
natural gas to make a move: In many cities, much of the
distribution infrastructure was already in place. 51
The largest hurdle really was the lack of sufficient pipeline
technology. How much gas a pipeline can move depends on
pressure, which in turn is a function of the pipe’s tensile strength,
its diameter, and the compression of the gas it is moving. Early
compressor technology was available by 1880, but improvements
in piping technology lagged behind. 52 The first serious natural gas
pipelines were made from cast iron, but even as steel began to
replace iron as a primary material in the 1890s, pipelines were
limited. This was in part because steel manufacturing had not
advanced sufficiently, but even more so because the steel had to be
welded or riveted, so pipes were only as good as their weaker
seams. 53
As a result, early gas markets were extremely localized. 54 The
first gas transport system that used metal, a five-and-a-half-milelong wrought iron pipeline that moved gas from the same
Titusville field where Colonel Drake had discovered oil, was built
in 1872 and was only two inches in diameter. 55 For almost two
49. Barlow, supra note 23, at 59 (noting S.R. Dresser’s invention of a leak proof coupling in 1890).
50. Barlow et al., supra note 41, at 82.
51. Id. at 82–83.
52. Id. at 83.
53. Id. at 84; JAMES G. SPEIGHT, NATURAL G AS : A BASIC HANDBOOK 127
(2007).
54. PEEBLES , supra note 15, at 54.
55. Barlow, supra note 23, at 59. Remarkably, this system was preceded by
a 25-mile-long wooden pipeline built in 1870 from West Bloomfield, New York ,
to Rochester. The “pipe” for this line consisted of “Canadian white pine logs,
two to eight feet long, turned down to a diameter of 12½ inches and bored to 8
inches.” STOTZ & JAMISON, supra note 15, at 78. Lack of demand for the gas,
coupled with difficulties running a wooden pipeline, forced the company to
later collapse, with a resulting loss of $1.5 million. Id.
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decades after that, no natural gas pipeline exceeded 100 miles, and
even when some lines grew longer, markets stayed local or
regional. The first line of significant length, for instance, a 120mile pipeline that served Chicago, brought fuel from the gas fields
of Indiana. 56 Likewise, the first company to supply a large city
with natural gas, run by J.N. Pew, brought gas from western
Pennsylvania to Pittsburgh. 57
Another problem for the early natural gas industry was that
developers often found the resource in shallow fields that were
easily depleted. This made the industry a risky business not just
physically but also financially, with many gas companies going out
of business after “a short and hectic” life. 58 “Indeed, such
disappointments were common in the Gas Belt of central Indiana,
where shallow reservoirs were tapped and effectively drained
within two decades (1886–1907).”59
What propelled gas forward, then, were two separate but
equally important developments. First, improvements in pipeline
manufacturing allowed the industry to expand its reach. Increased
demand for natural gas as an industrial feedstock and fuel
promoted the growth of new natural gas transportation systems. 60
The introduction of oxyacetylene welding in 1911 and electric
welding in 1922 meant that pipelines could extend their reach,
particularly when combined with new steel manufacturing and
procurement methods developed during World War II. 61 Thus, by
1924, there were only seven long-distance natural gas pipelines:
the Titusville and Chicago lines already mentioned, plus a 92-mile
line from Ohio to Detroit, a 183-mile line from West Virginia to
Cleveland, a 199-mile line in Texas, a 16-mile line from Louisiana
to Little Rock, and a 120-mile California line from Buena Vista to
Los Angeles. 62 In the last half of the 1920s, however, a boom of
pipeline construction broke out, with over 7,000 new miles of pipe
being laid for nineteen different long-distance lines—two of which
approached 1,000 miles and one of which exceeded that length—to
a variety of cities, including Houston, Wichita, Denver, Salt Lake,
St. Louis, Atlanta, and Washington, D.C. 63
For obvious reasons, the Great Depression slowed
construction of gas pipelines. In the ensuing years, however, the
nation added thousands of miles of natural gas pipelines,
including converting two lines, Big Inch and Little Big Inch, from
56. Barlow, supra note 23, at 83; SPEIGHT, supra note 53, at 127.
57. YERGIN, supra note 26, at 76. Gas transport lines also were generally
small in diameter, with few exceeding 8 inches. STOTZ & JAMISON, supra note
15, at 80.
58. PEEBLES , supra note 15, at 54.
59. BARLOW, supra note 23, at 60.
60. SPEIGHT, supra note 53, at 126.
61. BARLOW ET AL., supra note 41, at 84.
62. Id. at 86–87.
63. Id. at 88–91.
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oil to gas. The government had built those lines during the war to
circumvent the Germans’ sinking of oil tankers off the East Coast,
but now they were free for gas use. 64 The effect was significant.
From 1932 to 1944, the nation added nearly 2,000 miles of line;
from 1945 to 1956, over 16,000 miles; and 1957 to 1967, more than
9,000 miles. 65 These pipelines also were different in kind from
their early predecessors, commonly using diameters between 24
and 30 inches. 66 Even more important, they transformed the gas
market. In the 1910s, there were three distinct natural gas
markets—a northern market, a midcontinent market, and a southcentral market. 67 The construction of all these pipelines
obliterated this regional balkanization. Even if the market was not
yet quite fully national, it was clearly moving in that direction,
and it had become heavily interstate in nature. 68
The second development that changed the natural gas
industry was a series of shifts in how the fuel was used. As electric
lighting took hold of the illumination market, the gas industry
(both manufactured and natural) turned its focus to other
applications. Natural gas had been used in Pittsburgh as early as
1883 for industrial purposes, 69 but given the increasing
competition from electricity, the gas industry quickly developed a
wide array of domestic and other thermal applications—including
cooking ranges, air conditioners, refrigerators, hot plates, toasters,
irons, hair curlers, and, most importantly, space and water
heating. 70 Industrial applications also increased, with carbon black
manufacturers, for instance, moving their facilities from one
natural gas field to another to make that product, which long had
been used in ink, dyes, and paint but was also becoming a critical
input for rubber and tires. 71
While undeniably transformative, the natural gas industry’s
evolution did not take place over night. “The output of natural gas”
in the United States rose from “a value of $215,000 in 1882 . . . to
$13 million in 1896,” but it did not exceed $50 million until 1908. 72
By that year, there were over 21,000 producing wells in the United

64. Id. at 92–95.
65. Id. at 93–107.
66. See id.
67. JOHN H. HERBERT, CLEAN CHEAP HEAT: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
RESIDENTIAL MARKETS FOR NATURAL G AS IN THE UNITED STATES 11–13
(1992).
68. See id. at 100-03.
69. Peebles, supra note 15, at 54. By 1883, natural gas had become a
prominent fuel source for glass making in Pittsburgh, in part because of its
relative inexpensiveness. Brannt, supra note 24, at 661.
70. Herbert, supra note 67, at 21; Barlow, supra note 23, at 66; JOHN G.
CLARK, ENERGY AND THE FEDERAL G OVERNMENT: FOSSIL FUEL POLICIES ,
1900–1946 21 (1987).
71. PEEBLES , supra note 15, at 57–59.
72. STOTZ & JAMISON, supra note 15, at 88.
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States. 73 Still, as late as 1934, over half the gas in the Texas
Panhandle was still being flared. 74 Even by 1953, “bright spears of
light” dotted the night sky “along the endless highways of Texas,”
because natural gas remained “the orphan of the oil industry,” a
“useless, inconvenient by-product of oil production.”75
Cities were also slow to transition fully to natural gas, with
many mixing natural gas and manufactured gas for years. Detroit,
for instance, which had started using natural gas in 1848, took 90
years before it transitioned fully away from town gas. 76
Nonetheless, the transition proceeded, even if unevenly. Beginning
in the mid-1920s and extending into the 1930s, scores of gas
companies transitioned from manufactured gas to straight gas,
including in Atlanta, Birmingham, Buffalo, Denver, Des Moines,
Pittsburgh, Phoenix, and over 90 other cities. 77 As a result, by
1930, “natural gas accounted for about four-fifths of all distributor
sales in the United States.”78 Many cities, in fact, particularly in
the Southwest, had never used manufactured gas, although coalrich Appalachia hung on to this product the longest, with town gas
comprising 40 percent of Pennsylvania’s gas supply as late as
1930. 79 To that end, 1935 marked a turning point. It was in that
year that natural gas overtook manufactured gas as a fuel source
in the United States. 80 And by the 1940s and 1950s, town gas was
finally phased out. 81
It was in the first half of the twentieth century, then, that
natural gas shifted from an emerging industry to a prominent one.
This was especially true on the residential front. “The volume of
sales in this market grew fifty-fold between 1906 and 1970 and
eight-fold during the great growth period between 1945 and
1970.”82 By way of example, there were just over 5 million
residential gas customers in 1930, but there were just under 9.2
million only ten years later. 83 After the war, even more people
started using gas, with the nation adding 291,000 new residential
customers in 1945; 512,000 in 1946; 732,000 in 1947; 1.3 million in
1948; 1.2 million in 1949; and 2.2 million in 1950.

73. See id.
74. PEEBLES , supra note 15, at 55; see also Herbert, supra note 67, at 64.
75. YERGIN, supra note 26, at 411.
76. Barlow et al., supra note 41, at 83.
77. See STOTZ & JAMISON, supra note 15, at 298–302. As natural gas
replaced manufactured gas, prices also dropped. For instance, manufactured
gas in New York City in the late 1820s might run north of $12/Mcf, but by the
1910s, a similar amount of natural gas might sell for less than a dollar. Id. at
9.
78. BARLOW ET AL., supra note 41, at 83.
79. Id.
80. PEEBLES , supra note 15, at 55.
81. Id.
82. HERBERT, supra note 67, at 1.
83. Id. at 57, 87.
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Figure 2: U.S. Residential Natural Gas Use (billions of cubic
feet)84
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At the same time, the way the nation used natural gas was
changing. At the beginning of the twentieth century, industry
consumed 75 percent of total metered natural gas. 85 By 1948,
however, residential natural gas consumption “exceeded for the
first time the amount of [gas] that was vented or flared and
wasted . . . .”86 In fact, as illustrated by Figure 2 above, residential
natural gas consumption increased almost fourteen-fold from 1920
to 1965, from 286 billion cubic feet to 3,903 billion cubic feet. 87
This was remarkable enough, but it was even more notable given
that lighting in U.S. homes had shifted from 88 percent kerosene
in 1900, to 85 percent gas in 1910, to 79 percent electricity in 1940,
as illustrated in Figure 3. Utility use of natural gas was also
growing, increasing from 22 billion cubic feet in 1920 (2.7 percent
of total natural gas use) to 120 billion cubic feet (6 percent of total
natural gas use). 88
Thus, as the century unfolded, the natural gas industry’s
transition was complete. By the mid-1900s, the fuel had lost the
battle for the illumination market, but it also had become not just
an increasingly significant energy source but a truly important one
for the nation as well.

84. Id. at 98.
85. CLARK, supra note 70, at 145.
86. Id. at 103.
87. HERBERT, supra note 67, at 49, 104.
88. CLARK, supra note 70, at 145.
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Figure 3: Energy Sources for Illumination in U.S. Homes 89
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D. Turbulence: Energy Crisis, Legal Malfunction,
and the Opening of Markets
Just as gas began to settle into its growing role in the
economy, new and powerful external forces pushed it to change
again. One key driver was law. Public utilities became early
distributors of natural gas and were first subject to regulation by
municipal authorities, then by state agencies, and finally by the
federal government for some activities as well. 90 Adoption of the
Natural Gas Act (NGA) in 1938 gave the Federal Power
Commission (FPC) and then its successor agency, the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), authority to regulate
transportation prices for gas in pipelines, as well as prices and
terms for wholesale sales of gas. 91 For years, the FPC exercised
this authority using cost-of-service ratemaking, that is,
determining prices based on the actual cost of delivering the
service plus a reasonable rate of return. The FPC applied this
mechanism to interstate gas pipelines but not to independent
producers. “Thus, the FPC did not regulate producer prices, and
pipelines simply passed through producer prices to their end
customers.”92
In 1954, all that changed. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Wisconsin,93 the Supreme Court overturned the FPC’s
determination that independent gas producers—that is, producers
who did not own pipelines—were not natural gas companies
89. Id. at 60.
90. CLARK, supra note 70, at 21.
91. 15 U.S.C. § 717; see also CLARK, supra note 70, at 21.
92. DAVIES ET AL., supra note 14, at 634.
93. 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
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subject to NGA jurisdiction. “Regulation of the sales in interstate
commerce for resale made by a so-called independent natural-gas
producer,” the Court wrote, “is not essentially different from
regulation of such sales when made by an affiliate of an interstate
pipeline company. In both cases, the rates charged may have a
direct and substantial effect on the price paid by the ultimate
consumers [, whose protection is] the primary aim of the Natural
Gas Act.”94 As a result, following Phillips, the FPC was required to
apply rate regulation to thousands of independent gas producers.
The impact of Phillips was immense, although it took some
time to become visible in the public sphere. The FPC responded to
Phillips by attempting to follow its edict, instituting individual
rate cases for each of the now-jurisdictional gas producers. This
was a futile endeavor. “By 1960, [the FPC] had completed ten rate
cases and had developed a backlog of 2,900 pending cases.” 95
Chastised by the Court for its slow progress, 96 the Commission
then tried another tack. It began setting “area rates” for multiple
gas producers based on geography and historical costs. 97 And with
that move, the public actually began to feel Phillips’s impact.
In 1969, a year after the Supreme Court approved the FPC’s
“area rate” practice, 98 pipelines started reducing their deliveries to
local gas utilities. The FPC’s imposition of price controls had
disincentivized new exploration of gas, so a supply shortage was
developing—and it was quickly getting worse. 99 “By the unusually
cold winter of 1976–1977,” the shortage was so bad that “gas
service was no longer available to most prospective new customers;
thousands of manufacturing plants and schools were closed by
service curtailments; and, over 1 million workers were laid off
because of their employers’ inability to obtain gas.”100
At the same time, how the nation used natural gas had again
begun to evolve. In 1950, roughly 59 percent of gas was used by
industry, 27.5 percent went to residential and commercial
purposes, and only 11 percent was used to produce electricity, as
seen in Figure 4. 101 By 1975, those shares had changed
94. Id. at 685.
95. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Evolution of Natural Gas Regulatory Policy ,
10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV ’T 53 (Summer 1995).
96. See Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of New York, 360 U.S.
378 (1959).
97. See, e.g., Area Rate Proceeding (Hugoton-Anadarko Area), 30 F.P.C.
1354 (1963); Area Rate Proceeding (South Louisiana Area), 25 F.P.C. 942
(1961); see also Comment, Regulating Independent Gas Producers: The First
Area Attempt, 115 U. PA. L. REV . 84 (1966).
98. See Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 769–70 (1968); see
also Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 417 U.S. 283 (1974).
99. Pierce, supra note 95, at 53.
100. Id.
101. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., December 2015 Monthly Energy Review, 85
tbl. 4.3 Natural Gas Consumption by Sector (Release Date: December 23,
2015), www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/archive/00351512.pdf.
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significantly. A full 38 percent of gas was consumed for residential
and commercial uses, industrial use had shrunk to 43 percent, and
the electricity sector’s share had grown to 16 percent. 102 The fact
that consumers were increasingly reliant on gas as an energy
source only made the national shortage that much more acute.

Figure 4: U.S. Natural Gas Consumption by Sector 103
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Congress responded to the gas shortage with two key pieces of
legislation included in President Carter’s National Energy Act. 104
First, the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA) created a
complicated regime of twenty-three different classifications of gas,
creating statutory price ceilings that sought to protect consumers
but also to encourage natural gas exploration. 105 The NGPA also
gave FERC authority over both interstate and intrastate gas
production and markets. This unification of the gas market was
important, because part of the problem during the gas shortage
was that producers wanted to put gas into the intrastate market,
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Pub. L. No. 95-91 (1977); see also Julia Richardson & Robert
Nordhaus, The National Energy Act of 1978, 10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV ’T 62
(Summer 1995).
105. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301 et seq.; see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Past,
Present, and Future of Energy Regulation, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV . 291, 292
(2011) [hereinafter The Past, Present, and Future of Energy Regulation].
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which was tied to the higher world price of gas. However, gas could
not be taken out of the price-controlled interstate market without
Commission approval. 106 Second, the National Energy Act included
the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 (Fuel Use
Act), 107 which prohibited new (and existing, as designated by DOE)
powerplants and major industrial facilities from using natural gas
or petroleum as their primary fuel unless they had received an
exemption from the Department of Energy. 108 The idea of the Fuel
Use Act was to shift oil and gas away from industry and to
conserve it for consumers, in light of both the gas shortage and the
Arab oil embargo and the ensuing energy crisis of 1973. 109
The NGPA, while a step toward a more functional market, did
not solve all the nation’s gas problems. During the shortage,
pipelines had entered into take-or-pay contracts with producers,
attempting to ensure that they would have adequate gas to deliver
to consumers. 110 When gas prices were high because of the
shortage, this was not problematic. But as supplies increased and
prices fell following the NGPA’s adoption, these take-or-pay
contracts became troublesome. 111 Pipelines did not want to pay
higher contract rates when cheaper gas was available. Producers
wanted to reap the benefits of the bargains they had negotiated.
And consumers, of course, wanted the lowest-cost gas available. 112
Despite Congress’ efforts in the NGPA, then, the gas market still
needed restructuring. 113
FERC began its restructuring effort in earnest in 1985, when
it adopted Order No. 436. 114 That rule encouraged pipelines to

106. DAVIES ET AL., supra note 14, at 638–40.
107. Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289 (1978) (codified in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.)
108. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301 et seq.; see also Edward Lublin, The Future of the
Department of Energy’s Coal Conversion Program, 2 ENERGY L.J. 355 (1981).
109. The Past, Present, and Future of Energy Regulation, supra note 105,
at 291–95.
110. DAVIES ET AL., supra note 14, at 639.
111. Id. at 639–40.
112. Id. at 640.
113. For more on this topic, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Natural Gas
Regulation, Deregulation, and Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV . 63 (1982); Richard J.
Pierce, Reconsidering the Roles of Regulation and Competition in the Natural
Gas Industry, 97 HARV . L. REV . 345 (1983).
114. Order No. 436, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines Afte r Partial
Wellhead Decontrol, [Regulations Preambles 1982–1985] F.E.R.C. Stats. &
Regs. ¶ 30,665 (1985), modified, Order No. 436-A [Regulations Preambles
1982–1985] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. ¶ 30,675 (1985), modified further, Order
No. 436-B, III F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. ¶ 30,688, reh’g denied, Order No. 436-C,
34 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,404, reh’g denied, Order No. 436-D, 34 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,405,
reconsideration denied, Order No. 436-E, 34 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,403 (1986), vacated
and remanded sub nom., Associated Gas Distrib. v. F.E.R.C., 824 F.2d 981
(D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom., 485 U.S. 1006 (1988); see also John
Wyeth Griggs, Restructuring the Natural Gas Industry: Order No. 436 and
Other Regulatory Initiatives, 7 ENERGY L.J. 71 (1986); Philip M. Marston,
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become something akin to common carriers. In exchange for
“blanket” authorization to enter into transportation agreements
with gas producers, participating pipelines had to agree to provide
“open access” service to all producers on a first-come, first-serve
basis; “unbundle” their transportation services and gas sales; not
discriminate in their provision of transport service; and
disaggregate their merchant and transport functions. 115 “Although
voluntary, all of the major pipelines eventually took part in the
Order No. 436 scheme. This allowed their customers to save
money, by accessing the cheaper gas in the spot markets.”116
Four years later, in 1989, Congress took the opening of U.S.
gas markets to the next level. In the Natural Gas Wellhead
Decontrol Act (NGWDA), 117 Congress effectively reversed the
Phillips decision and the band-aid solution the NGPA had put on
it. This law dictated that, with the exception of gas sales by
pipelines and local distribution utilities, all gas wellhead price
regulations would be lifted as of January 1, 1993. Then, just as the
NGWDA was about to take effect, FERC completed the job. In its
Order No. 636, adopted in 1992, FERC made mandatory the
various pipeline practices it had only encouraged in Order No.
436. 118
As a result, competition became king in the gas industry.
While regulation still remained, including by FERC for transport
rates and by state public service commissions for retail prices,
producers now enjoyed the clearest path to market for their gas
they had ever had.

Pipeline Restructuring: The Future of Open-Access Transportation, 12 ENERGY
L.J. 53 (1991); Stephen F. Williams, The Proposed Sea-Change in Natural Gas
Regulation, 6 ENERGY L.J. 233 (1985).
115. DAVIES ET AL., supra note 14, at 640.
116. Id.
117. Pub. L. No. 101-60, 103 Stat. 157 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3311–3432);
see also Steven M. Spaeth, Our Experience Under the Natural Gas Policy Act of
1978, and Its Relevance to the Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989, 12
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 265 (1989/1990).
118. Order No. 636, Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to
Regulations Governing Self-Implementing Transportation under Part 282 of
the Commission’s Regulations and Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After
Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 59 F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. ¶ 61,030, order on
reh’g, Order No. 636-A, 60 F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. ¶ 61,102, order on reh’g,
Order No. 636-B, 61 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,272 (1992), order on reh’g, 62 F.E.R.C.
¶ 61,007 (1993), aff’d in part and remanded in part sub nom., United
Distribution Cos. v. F.E.R.C., 88 F.3d 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1996), order on remand,
Order No. 636-C, 78 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,186 (1997). For more on the impact of
Orders No. 436 and 636, see, for instance, Anne V. Roland, Status Report on
the US Natural Gas Industry, 16 ENERGY POL’Y 226 (1988); Arthur De Vany &
W. David Walls, Natural Gas Industry Transformation, Competitive
Institutions and the Role of Regulation: Lessons from Open Access in US
Natural Gas Markets, 22 ENERGY POL’Y 755 (1994).
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E. Modern Light: The Increasing Connection Between
Gas and Electricity
Far and away, as we near the end of this decade, the biggest
headline for natural gas is the rise of hydraulic fracturing. Indeed,
it should be the headline. The combination of horizontal drilling
and hydraulic fracturing—often referred to as “fracking” or
“fracing”—has utterly transformed gas production in the United
States. In 2007, gas from shale resources accounted for only 8
percent of total U.S. gas withdrawals. 119 As of 2013, however,
shale gas tallied almost 40 percent of U.S. production. 120 Shale gas
also clearly has affected gas prices in the United States, driving
them down by increasing supplies. Thus, natural gas spot prices at
Henry Hub were $7.11 per million BTU in December 2007, but
they were down to $1.93 per million BTU in December 2015. 121
Likewise, NYMEX futures prices for Contract 1 natural gas were
$7.114 per million BTU in 2007 but only $2.627 per million BTU
in 2015. 122
While the shale gas revolution has received more than its fair
share of media and scholarly attention, less commonly highlighted
is its connection to the use of gas in electricity production. 123 That
connection is both immediate and deep. It is immediate in the
sense that more abundant, less expensive gas has made the
production of electricity using gas more attractive to the industry.
It is deep in the sense that the use of gas to generate electricity
has only grown over time, and already was on a strong uptick
heading into the 2000s. Facilitating this, just as had been the case
for natural gas restructuring, was a series of important legislative
and regulatory changes that sought to promote competition in the
electricity generation industry.

119. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Natural Gas Gross Withdrawals and
Production (Aug. 31, 2015), www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_sum_dcu_nus_a.htm.
120. Id. Several major “shale plays” exist across the United States, the
largest of which are: the Bakken Shale in eastern North Dakota and Western
Montana, the Marcellus Shale in the Appalachian Basin, the Barnett Shale in
Texas, the Fayetteville Shale in Arkansas, and the Haynesville Shale in
Louisiana and eastern Texas. William J. Brady & James P. Crannell,
Hydraulic Fracturing Regulation in the United States: The Laissez-Faire
Approach of the Federal Government and Varying State Regulations 14 VT. J.
ENVTL. L. 39, 40–42 (2012). Other significant shale plays exist in Arizona,
Colorado, Kentucky, Michigan, Utah, and Wyoming. Id.
121. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price, (last
updated Apr. 13, 2016), www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngw hhdm.htm.
122. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Natural Gas Futures Contract 1 (last
updated Apr. 13, 2016), www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngc1a.htm.
123. Debate surrounding hydraulic fracturing focuses on fracturing fluid
and wastewater and methane emissions resulting from the fracturing process.
Elizabeth Burleson, Climate Change and Natural Gas Dynamic Governance,
63 CASE W. L. REV . 1217, 1224 (2013).
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The changes began in 1978. Another key statute adopted as
part of the National Energy Act was the Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA). 124 Among other things, PURPA
required incumbent electric utilities to purchase power from small
renewable and cogeneration facilities, collectively referred to as
“qualifying facilities,” or QFs, under the statute. 125 The utilities,
moreover, had to pay incentive rates for this power—the so-called
“avoided cost” of the electricity that the utility would have had to
pay to otherwise acquire power. 126 Thus, while this law did not
formally encourage electricity production from natural gas, it did
set the stage. It did so by opening the market, which previously
had been dominated by vertically integrated incumbent utilities,
to other types of generators.
Of course, the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act, also
adopted as part of the National Energy Act, generally foreclosed
use of natural gas in new electricity generation facilities. 127
However, as natural gas supplies increased in the 1980s, Congress
saw fit to repeal the portions of that law pertaining to prohibitions
on the use of natural gas; it did so in 1987, only nine years after
the Fuel Use Act had been adopted. 128 With this, the door was
cracked open for greater natural gas use in electricity production.
Five years later, Congress swung the door the rest of the way.
In the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct 1992), 129 Congress created
a new kind of electric entity—the “exempt wholesale generator,” or
“EWG.”130 The idea was simple: encourage more competition for
electricity production. The creation of EWG status did this by
breaking down the legal and financial barriers to participation in
the wholesale electricity market. Prior to EPAct 1992, there were
only three basic ways a non-utility could sell wholesale
generation. 131 It could build or acquire a QF under PURPA. It
could create a “PUHCA pretzel,” a generator in which no utility
held more than a 10 percent ownership share. Or it could become a
holding company under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of
124. Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 2, 92 Stat. 3117, 3119 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §
918c, 42 U.S.C. § 6808, scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 16. U.S.C., and 43
U.S.C. (2013)).
125. Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 210, 92 Stat. 3117, 3119 (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 824a-3 (2014)).
126. Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 210(b)–(d), 92 Stat. 3117, 3119 (codified at 16
U.S.C. § 824a-3(b)–(d)).
127. Pub. L. No. 95-620, § 102, 92 Stat. 3289 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § §
8301–8484 (1978)).
128. Pub. L. No. 100-42, § 1, 101 Stat. 310 (1987).
129. Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1701z-16, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3506, scattered sections of 16 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C.,
30 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C. (2013)).
130. Pub. L. No. 102-486, §§ 711–715, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992).
131. Jeffrey D. Watkiss & Douglas W. Smith, The Energy Policy Act of
1992—A Watershed for Competition in the Wholesale Power Market, 10 YALE J.
ON REG. 447, 464–65 (1993).
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1935 (PUHCA). 132 None of these options was palatable. The scope
of facilities that could be QFs was narrow. Lenders were not fond
of the PUHCA pretzel model. And becoming a PUHCA holding
company posed significant regulatory hurdles that most
developers were not willing to bear. 133 The ability for non-utility
generators to become EWGs, however, created a path around these
obstacles, because it razed the PUHCA barrier.
Thus, EPAct 1992 meant that non-renewable and noncogeneration facilities, including gas-fired generators, could start
competing in the market. The law was unquestionably successful
in this endeavor. In fact, “the first application for EWG status was
filed with FERC within two days of [EPAct 1992’s enactment, and]
a total of three applications were filed within the first month.” 134
As one commentator observed only three years after the law’s
passage, “EWGs are multiplying and are looking for markets to
serve.”135
In the early 1990s, FERC was also busy doing its own work to
foment a competitive wholesale generation market. It began by
granting authority for utilities and other entities to sell electricity
at “market-based” rates, or prices they negotiated with each
other, 136 rather than seeking cost-of-service approval under the
“just and reasonable” standard of Federal Power Act Section
205. 137 FERC also adopted perhaps its most significant rule ever
on the electricity side of its jurisdiction, Order No. 888, which
imposed on transmission owners the same requirements that
Order No. 636 did on gas pipelines. 138 Thus, beginning in 1996,
transmission owners were required to sell excess transmission
capacity on a first-come, first-serve basis. As a result, just as had
been the case for gas, competitors in the electricity industry now
could move their product freely within the market, without
worrying that their competitive threats to incumbent utility

132. 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6.
133. Watkiss & Smith, supra note 131, at 464–65.
134. Id. at 465.
135. Arturo Gándara, United States-Mexico Electricity Transfers: Of Alien
Electrons and the Migration of Undocumented Environmental Burdens , 16
ENERGY L.J. 1, 23 (1995).
136. DAVIES ET AL., supra note 14, at 399–409.
137. 16 U.S.C. § 824d.
138. Order No. 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open
Access Non-discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery
of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, [Regs.
Preambles 1991–1996] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036 (1996), 61 Fed. Reg.
21,540 (1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. §§ 35, 385) [hereinafter Order No.
888], order on reh’g, Order No. 888-A, F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,048 (1997),
order on reh’g, Order No. 888-B, 81 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,248, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,688
(1997), order on reh’g, Order No. 888-C, 82 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,046 (1998), aff’d in
relevant part sub nom., Transmission Access Policy Study Grp. v. FERC, 225
F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff’d sub nom., New York v. F.E.R.C., 535 U.S. 1
(2002).
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transmission owners’ longstanding business would result in
discrimination.
At the same time that Congress and FERC were pushing hard
to open the generation market to more competition, technological
developments helped ensure that natural gas would gain an
increasingly important role in the market. Rather than using oldstyle boilers to burn gas and create electricity, companies had
started using small, modular units employing jet engine
technology to produce power. 139 Not only were these units more
efficient, they also could be quickly deployed and targeted to
specific areas in need of power. Indeed, when EPAct 1992 was
adopted, the expectation was that many EWGs would be gas-fired
generators. 140 That, in fact, turned out to be the case. 141
Figure 5: Share of Natural Gas in the U.S. Electricity
Fleet 142
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139. See, e.g., RICHARD F. HIRSH, TECHNOLOGY AND TRANSFORMATION IN
AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY 164 (1989).
140. Richard D. Cudahy, PURPA: The Intersection of Competition and
Regulatory Policy, 16 ENERGY L.J. 419, 424 (1995); Richard D. Cudahy &
William D. Henderson, From Insull to Enron: Corporate (Re)Regulation After
the Rise and Fall of Two Energy Icons, 26 ENERGY L.J. 35, 82 (2005); see also
Alan Miller & Adam Serchuk, The Promise and Peril in a Restructured
Electric System, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV ’T 118 (Fall 1997) (noting the
expectation in 1995 that gas generation would increase from 15 to 31 percent
of the market share).
141. See, e.g., Jess Totten, Development of Competition in Electricity in
Texas, 1 ENVT’L & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 67, 69 (2005) (noting that in Texas
“roughly 28,000 MW of new generation capacity was built” between 1995 and
2005—and most of it was “efficient combined-cycle capacity fueled by natural
gas”).
142. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., Annual Energy Review 2011, 260 tbl.
8.11c (2011), www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/pdf/aer.pdf.
THE
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From the late 1980s through the restructuring of the 1990s to
now, natural gas has only become a more and more dominant force
in the production of electricity in this country. In fact, natural gas
accounted for the largest growth in electricity generation over the
last seventeen years. 143 Thus, from 1989 to 1995 to 2011, natural
gas generation capacity installed in the United States grew from
119,304 MW to 145,282 MW to 368,260 MW—a more than
threefold increase in just over two decades. 144 Likewise, as
illustrated in Figure 5, natural gas’s share of installed generation
facilities more than doubled in this timeframe—from 17.3 percent
in 1989, to 20.2 percent in 1995, to 37.3 percent in 2011. 145
Even more critical, the addition of all this natural gas
capacity significantly changed how the nation produces power,
aided, no doubt, by declining gas prices from the shale gas
revolution. Consequently, in 1989, only 10.4 percent of the nation’s
electricity came from natural gas. 146 In 1995, that figure was up
only slightly, to 13.1 percent. 147 But by 2011, it had reached nearly
a quarter of total electricity production, at 23.5 percent—and by
2014, it had surpassed that threshold, soaring to 26.2 percent, as
shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Share of
Generation (kWh)148
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143. Jeff Hopkins, Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, Modeling
EPA’s Clean Power Plan: Insights for Cost-effective Implementation 6–7 (2015).
144. See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Annual Energy Review 2011, 260 tbl.
8.11c (2011), www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/pdf/aer.pdf.
145. Id.
146. See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., January 2016 Monthly Energy Review,
110 tbl. 7.2b (Jan. 27, 2016) www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/archive/
00351601.pdf.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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Thus, as the Obama administration prepared to issue its
proposed Clean Power Plan rule in 2014, natural gas occupied a
unique place in the U.S. energy landscape. In one sense, its
position was new. With technological change and the opening of
markets, natural gas had become quite dominant. It was critical in
the economy, increasingly used for electricity production, and
looked to as a fuel for the future. Still, in another sense, natural
gas’s perch was old—and possibly shaky. It was only two-and-ahalf decades earlier that gas was “reserved by regulatory fiat for
its highest use—home heating[—and] was emphatically not to be
used for electric generation, for heating swimming pools, or for
burning in gas logs.”149 That this fuel had come so far in so short a
time revealed much about its evolution, and the rapidity with
which energy outlooks can change. But, the fact that energy
landscapes can shift so quickly also begged the question whether
natural gas can maintain its position—and if it can, what role in
society it will play next.
The Clean Power Plan, as it turns out, may have much to say
about that.

III. FORECASTS AND PROJECTIONS: THE ROLE OF
NATURAL GAS IN THE CLEAN POWER PLAN
The Clean Power Plan cannot be understood outside the
context of natural gas’s growing prominence in U.S. electricity
production generally, including the role that hydraulic fracturing
has played in building gas’s newfound position. While natural
gas’s role in the nation’s energy economy has evolved over time,
today the fuel is in perhaps its starkest transition yet. In recent
years, as noted, both natural gas production and its use by the
electricity sector have grown rapidly, driven heavily by the
combination of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing.
Together, those technologies have rapidly expanded the
availability—and lowered the cost—of gas resources. 150 Thus, a
fuel that once was seen as a nuisance byproduct of oil, and only in
recent decades became stable enough to garner a strong position in
the electricity sector, now is a dominant force in the United States’
energy system.
Shifts in natural gas production alone demonstrate the
immensity—and extensiveness—of this change. Over the last ten
years, domestic natural gas production grew by 40 percent: from
approximately 50 Bcfd in 2005 to 70 Bcfd in 2014. 151 U.S. natural
149. Richard D. Cudahy, The Folklore of Deregulation (with Apologies to
Thurman Arnold), 15 YALE J. ON REG. 427, 435 (1998).
150. See Advanced Energy Economic Institute, Impacts of the Clean Power
Plan on U.S. Natural Gas Markets and Pipeline Infrastructure 4 (2015)
[hereinafter Impacts of the Clean Power Plan].
151. Id.
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gas consumption also rose roughly 20 percent in that same period,
from approximately 22 million cubic feet in 2005 to 26.6 million
cubic feet in 2014. 152 Again, shale gas was a primary catalyst for
this transition, accounting for approximately 50 percent of U.S.
production in 2014.153 Indeed, today, shale gas production exceeds
that from conventional natural gas resources. 154
While undeniably important, the rise of hydraulic fracturing
is not the sole cause of natural gas’s rise in the electricity sector.
Other factors, including the opening of competition in the
generation sector of the electricity industry, 155 as well as other new
regulatory regimes, have also encouraged electricity producers to
switch out coal for other fuels, including natural gas.
EPA’s Mercury Air Toxics Standards (MATS), for instance,
adopted in 2012, effectively encourage electric utilities to reduce
their coal generation. 156 These standards place limits on coal- and
oil-fired electric generating units (EGUs) to reduce mercury air
pollution from units with a capacity of 25 MW or more. 157 Natural
gas is a competitive fuel source for electricity under the MATS
because burning natural gas results in negligible mercury
emissions compared to coal. 158
Likewise, since the mid-1990s, over two-thirds of states have
adopted renewable portfolio standards (RPSs) and other laws
encouraging
use
of
renewable
resources
for electricity
production. 159 As electricity generation from renewables has
152. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Natural Gas Total Consumption,
www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9140us2a.htm (last visited Dec. 31, 2015) .
153. Impacts of the Clean Power Plan, supra note 150, at 5.
154. Id. Increased production from shale resources has offset production
declines from conventional resources. Production from conventional resources
declined substantially over the past decade—from roughly 45 Bcfd in 2005 to
approximately 35 Bcfd in 2014. Reliance on shale resources also has shifted
the locus of natural gas production, creating new supply centers and changing
regional markets. Prior to the shale gas revolution, prices were usually lower
in the Gulf Coast, where there are many conventional resources, and higher in
the Northeast, where winter demand is heavy. However, growth of Marcellus
shale production in the Northeast significantly lowered spot market prices in
that area. Id. at 4–5.
155. See supra Part II.E.
156. Impacts of the Clean Power Plan, supra note 150, at 6; see also 40
C.F.R. pts. 60, 63.
157. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Mercury and Air Toxics Standards:
Basic Information, www3.epa.gov/mats/basic.html (last visited Dec. 31, 2015).
158. See Union of Concerned Scientists, Environmental Impacts of Natural
Gas,
www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/our-energy-choices/coal-and-other-fossilfuels/environmental-impacts-of-natural-gas.html#.VogntjbT7q8
(last visited
Dec. 31, 2015).
159. Lincoln L. Davies, State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Is There a
“Race” and Is It “To the Top”?, 3 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 3, 5
(2012); See also Lincoln L. Davies, Evaluating RPS Policy Design: Metrics,
Gaps, Best Practices, and Paths to Innovation, 4 KLRI JOURNAL OF LAW &
LEGISLATION 3 (2014); Uma Outka, Intrastate Preemption in the Shifting
Energy Sector, 86 U. COLO. L. REV . 927, 935 (2015).
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increased, more nimble generation resources like natural gas have
gained importance, because they are needed to ramp up and down
quickly to maintain system stability when intermittent renewables
like wind and solar fall off in production.
The future of natural gas often is placed in this context. Many
observers suggest that natural gas will play an even greater role
in electricity production going forward because of the shale boom,
and that gas must play that role if the United States is to move to
a clean energy economy. 160 This, certainly, is how many have
portrayed the Clean Power Plan—as a rule that does not just seek
to limit electricity production from coal-fired plants but also as one
that will use natural gas facilities to get there.
It should come as little surprise, then, that many suggest that
natural gas’s role in electricity production, and society, will only
increase under the Clean Power Plan. As it turns out, however,
what effect the Plan may have on natural gas use may be more
complicated than would first appear.
The remainder of this Part first summarizes the EPA’s
recently promulgated Clean Power Plan rule. It then surveys
various forecasts and projections of that Plan’s likely impact on
natural gas.

A. The EPA’s Clean Power Plan
On August 3, 2015, the EPA issued its new rule limiting
greenhouse gas emissions from electricity facilities—Carbon
Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units (EGUs)—more commonly known
as the Clean Power Plan (CPP).161 The Clean Power Plan seeks to
reduce CO2 emissions from the electricity sector by roughly 32
percent of 2005 levels by 2030. 162 In this way, and in combination
with other measures, 163 the EPA seeks to reduce domestic
greenhouse gas emissions from the electricity sector, which leads
160. See infra Part IV.A; see also, e.g., JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY
ENERGY POLICY: PRELUDE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 112 (2011).
161. Carbon Pollution Emissions Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661 (Oct. 23, 2015)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 60) [hereinafter Clean Power Plan].
162. Id.
163. Use of energy in the United States can be divided roughly into two
halves—electricity and transport. The CPP is the EPA’s primary effort to
reduce GHG emissions in the electricity sector. For transport, the EPA and the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration established limits on GHG
emissions in 2012 via mobile source pollutant limits and Corporate Average
Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards. See 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty
Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy
Standards, 40 C.F.R. §§ 85, 86, 600 (2012). The agencies promulgated the
standards following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549
U.S. 497, 534 (2007), which clarified that GHG emissions are a pollutant
under the Clean Air Act.
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the nation in such emissions. 164 The EPA estimates that the Clean
Power Plan will result in $26 to 45 billion in net overall benefits,
which includes $14 to 34 billion in health benefits for the public,
and $20 billion in climate benefits such as changes in net
agricultural productivity and energy system costs. 165 Nonetheless,
if it is upheld in court, 166 the Plan will also significantly impact the
electricity sector. In fact, the EPA estimates that power sector
compliance with the Plan will cost roughly $7.4 billion per year
between 2020 and 2030. 167
EPA issued the CPP rule under Section 111(d) of the Clean
Air Act (CAA), which gives the agency authority to promulgate
regulations requiring states to “establish[] standards of
performance for any existing” stationary source of air pollutants
regulated under the CAA, including rules “for the implementation
and enforcement of such standards of performance.”168 Relying on
that power, the CPP established two targets that each state must
meet to reduce their CO2 emissions. 169 First, the Plan set interim
compliance targets for states between 2022 and 2029. Second, the
Plan announced a final target that states must meet by 2030. 170
These interim and final emission reduction targets were based on
EPA’s determination of the “best system of emissions reduction”
(BSER) for CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel-fired electric steam
generating units and stationary combustion turbines. 171
Under the Clean Air Act’s cooperative federalist regime, each
state has flexibility in deciding how to meet the CPP’s emissions
limits.172 The EPA determined BSER using three “building blocks”
that states might leverage to reach their targets: (1) “reducing the
carbon intensity of electricity generation by improving the heat
rate of existing coal-fired power plants”; 173 (2) “substituting

164. In 2013, emissions from the electricity sector totaled 31 percent,
outweighing emissions from transportation, which accounted for 27 percent of
U.S. emissions. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Sources of Greenhouse Gas
Emissions,
www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/sources.html
(last
visited Jan. 6, 2016).
165. See Clean Power Plan, supra note 161; see also U.S. Envtl. Protection
Agency, The Social Cost of Carbon, www3.epa.gov/climatechange/EPA
activities/economics/scc.html (last visited Jan 14, 2016).
166. Thomas Overton, Political Opposition to Clean Power Plan Looms
Large, Experts Say, POWER MAGAZINE (Dec. 9, 2015), www.powermag.com
/political-opposition-to-clean-power-plan-loom-large-experts-say/.
167. Hopkins, supra note 143, at 5.
168. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) (2013).
169. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Overview of the Clean Power Plan:
Cutting Carbon Pollution From Power Plants 5 (2015), www.epa.gov/clean
powerplan/fact-sheet-overview-clean-power-plan#print [hereinafter Overview
of the Clean Power Plan].
170. Id.
171. Clean Power Plan, supra note 161.
172. Overview of the Clean Power Plan, supra note 169, at 3.
173. Id. at 4.
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increased electricity generation from lower-emitting natural gas
plants,”
also
known
as
coal-to-gas
switching; 174
and
(3) “substituting increased electricity generation from new zeroemitting renewable energy sources.”175 Thus, although each state
will choose different measures to reach their respective CPP
mandate, 176 the final rule anticipated that increasing the role of
natural gas in the electricity sector will be one key way that
jurisdictions reach compliance.
The interim and final emission reduction goals established by
the CPP give states two different options for achieving compliance:
(1) a rate-based goal measured in pounds of CO 2 per megawatt
hour and (2) a mass-based goal measured in total short tons of CO 2
reduced. The EPA established these separate targets to “maximize
the range of choices available to states in implementing the
standards and to utilities in meeting them.”177 The mass-based
goals and rate-based goals have similar reduction targets, but the
mass-based target seeks to facilitate allowance trading programs.
The EPA also developed an alternative mass-based goal that
includes a new source complement for states that may want to
include both existing and new sources in their plans and to
account for emissions growth. 178
Because the CPP does not mandate how states must meet
their targets, the rule’s likely effects remain uncertain. Not until
states submit their compliance plans for EPA approval will it
become clear exactly how the CPP may impact composition of the
nation’s generation fleet.179 States have the flexibility to develop
plans relying on any combination of the three building blocks, as
well as other CO2 emissions-reducing strategies—including
increased use of nuclear power or implementation of energy
efficiency and conservation initiatives. 180 Indeed, EPA specifically
contemplated that the Plan will reduce electricity demand through
end-use energy efficiency. 181
The ultimate impact of the CPP is not just unclear because it
will take time for states to decide how to comply. Legal wrangling
around the rule also has created significant uncertainty. 182

174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Overview of the Clean Power Plan, supra note 169, at 5.
177. Id. at 3.
178. Kevin Poloncarz & Ben Carrier, EPA Finalizes Ambitious Clean
Power Plan, Paul Hastings Insights (Aug. 7, 2015), www.paulhastings.com/
publications-items/details/?id=b759e669-2334-6428-811c-ff00004cbded.
179. Hopkins, supra note 143, at 2.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1.
182. E&E Publishing, LLC, The Fate of the Obama Administration’s
Signature Climate Change Rule is in the Hands of the Courts ,
www.eenews.net/interactive/clean_power_plan/fact_sheets/legal (last visited
Apr. 28, 2016).
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Currently, twenty-seven states have challenged the rule in federal
court, 183 and on February 9, 2016, the Supreme Court stayed the
rule, halting implementation pending review by the D.C.
Circuit. 184 Partially in response to the Court’s stay, nineteen states
suspended their efforts to develop compliance mechanisms with
the Plan. 185
If the CPP rule is upheld in court, models project that energy
efficiency measures will provide the least-cost option for
compliance, so many states may be likely to rely heavily on
efficiency measures first before making other changes to their
electricity systems. Once energy efficiency is maximized, however,
most models show a likely increased reliance on natural gas,
though the precise contours of how that shift may develop are
more complex. 186

B. Forecasting Natural Gas’s Role Under
the Clean Power Plan
It is clear that the Clean Power Plan, if upheld, will have an
immediate effect on both the natural gas market and the use of
natural gas for electricity generation. Numerous groups have run
models to forecast how the Clean Power Plan may impact the
nation’s energy systems. Here, we summarize the results of seven
of these models. Three of the models—the EPA’s, Energy Ventures
Analysis’s (EVA), and the Natural Resources Defense Council’s
(NRDC)—considered only the CPP’s impact on the power sector. 187
The other four—the Advanced Energy Economic Institute’s (AEE),
the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s (EIA), National
Economic Research Associates’ (NERA), and the Rhodium Group
and Center for Strategic and International Studies’ (RhodiumCSIS)—assessed the Plan’s likely impact on both the electricity
sector and the broader natural gas sector. 188
Each model took a slightly different approach. The EPA
model is unique because it created forecasts using both the rule’s

183. Overton, supra note 166.
184. Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 999 (2016).
185. E&E Publishing, LLC, E&E’s Power Plan Hub: Legal Challenges,
www.eenews.net/interactive/clean_power_plan#legal_challenge_status_chart
(last visited Jan. 6, 2016) (noting that Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado,
Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Texas, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming suspended planning).
186. HOPKINS , supra note 143, at 2.
187. See id. at 3.
188. See id., see also Impacts of the Clean Power Plan, supra note 150, at 3,
U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Analysis of the Impacts of the Clean Power Plan 5
(2015) [hereinafter Analysis of the Clean Power Plan].

2015]

The Role of Natural Gas in the Clean Power Plan

357

rate-based emission goals and its mass-based emission goals.189
The other models relied on rate-based targets. AEE, EIA, EVA,
NERA, NRDC, and Rhodium-CSIS ran their models based on the
proposed rule. EPA ran its model in 2015 based on the final
rule. 190
The models also differed in their construction, and which
sensitivities they measured. EVA’s model included a single
scenario with projections to 2020. 191 The NRDC ran a series of
scenarios with different generation portfolios, reflecting varying
levels of conversion from high-CO2-emitting resources to loweremitting sources. 192 NRDC also performed a sensitivity analysis
that assumed states and utilities would implement only half of
available energy efficiency measures. 193 NERA ran two scenarios:
an “unconstrained” scenario where states were assumed to utilize
all compliance mechanisms, and a “constrained” scenario where
states would reach compliance without using renewables or energy
efficiency. 194 The AEE model includes two scenarios: a “mixedsource” compliance scenario where states use a mix of compliance
mechanisms, and a “stress-test” scenario where Henry Hub gas
prices fall by 20 percent. 195 Similarly, the EIA model includes,
among others, a scenario with higher natural gas supply and low
natural gas prices. 196 Rhodium-CSIS modeled a regional emissions
rate and conducted national and regional scenarios with and
189. Envtl. Protection Agency, Regulatory Impacts Analysis for the Clean
Power Plan Final Rule 3-7 (2015) [hereinafter Regulatory Impacts Analysis].
190. Although the AEE, EIA EVA, NERA, NRDC, and Rhodium -CSIS
models based their projections on the rate-based emission goals in the EPA’s
proposed Clean Power Plan, the final rate-based emission goals do not
substantially differ from the proposed goals. A majority of the state goals
remained roughly the same, increasing or decreasing by less than 300 lbs
CO 2/MWh. The EPA altered the goal of fifteen states, however, by more than
300 lbs CO 2/MWh. In the final rule, the EPA increase the rate -based emission
goal of Arizona, Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York,
Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Washington by 300 lbs CO 2/MWh
or more. Kentucky, Montana, North Dakota, West Virginia, and Wyoming saw
their emissions goal decrease by 300 lbs CO 2/MWh or more. See Carbon
Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34830 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. § 60); Clean Power Plan, supra note 161.
191. Energy Ventures Analysis, Energy Market Impacts of Recent Federal
Regulations on the Electric Power Sector 10 (2014) [hereinafter Energy
Market Impacts].
192. Natural Resources Defense Council, Comment on EPA’s Proposed
Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 8-2 (Dec. 1, 2014), www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail
;D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602-2332 [hereinafter NRDC Comment].
193. Id.
194. David Harrison et al., NERA Economic Consulting, Potential Energy
Impacts of the EPA Proposed Clean Power Plan S-2 (2014) [hereinafter
Potential Energy Impacts].
195. Impacts of the Clean Power Plan, supra note 150, at 2.
196. Analysis of the Clean Power Plan, supra note 188, at 12.
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without energy efficiency as a CPP compliance mechanism. 197
Rhodium-CSIS also conducted two stress-test scenarios with high
and low gas prices. The AEE, EVA, and NERA scenarios allowed
interstate emissions trading. The AEE, EVA, EPA, NERA, and
NRDC models include projections to 2030. The EIA model includes
projections to 2040. Table A summarizes the major points of each
CPP model.
Table A: Summary of CPP Models
Model
End
Year

Scenarios Modeled

Advanced
Energy
Economic
Institute

2030

States utilize mix of
compliance
mechanisms

Henry Hub prices
decrease by 20%

Proposed

Energy
Information
Administration

2040

Various

High natural gas
supply combined
with low gas prices

Proposed

Environmental
Protection
Agency

2030

Rate-based and
mass-based
emissions goal
projections

None

Final

Energy
Ventures
Analysis

2030

Rate-based
emissions goal
projections

None

Proposed

National
Economic
Research
Associates

2030

States implement
all compliance
mechanisms

States reach
compliance without
using renewable
resources or energy
efficiency

Proposed

Natural
Resources
Defense Council

2030

Various

States utilize half of
available energy
efficiency measures

Proposed

2030

National and
regional emissions
rate scenarios with
and without energy
efficiency

A high gas price
scenario and a low
gas price scenario

Proposed

Model

Rhodium Group
and Center for
Strategic and
International
Studies

Sensitivity Analyses

Version
of Rule
Modeled

197. JOHN LARSEN ET AL., RHODIUM G ROUP & CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES , REMAKING AMERICAN POWER: POTENTIAL ENERGY
MARKET IMPACTS OF EPA’S PROPOSED GHG EMISSION PERFORMANCE
STANDARDS FOR EXISTING ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS 12 (2014) [hereinafter,
Remaking American Power].
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Predicting energy futures is an infamously perilous task. 198
Nonetheless, these models’ forecasts of how the Clean Power Plan
may play out are illuminating, particularly because they align in a
number of key ways. First, the models suggest that electricity
generation and consumption should decrease under the CPP,
likely driven by the rule’s encouragement of demand reduction
through energy efficiency measures. 199 Second, the models show
declining coal generation, which makes sense given that this is a
key objective of the CPP. Finally, and importantly, a majority of
the models anticipate an increase in natural gas generation in the
near-term but declining natural gas demand and production by
2030. 200 Accordingly, the models do not project large increases in
natural gas infrastructure.
The models’ projections fall into three key areas relevant to
the role of natural gas under the Clean Power Plan: (1) electricity
generation and consumption; (2) natural gas demand and price;
and (3) natural gas infrastructure.
1.

Electricity Generation and Consumption

The models uniformly predict that the Clean Power Plan will
result in less coal generation and, concomitantly, more natural gas
generation as power producers switch from coal to gas. 201 Under
these forecasts, the Clean Power Plan should cause three distinct
shifts in the electricity sector. First, the models suggest that the
Plan will cause an overall reduction in energy consumption, and
thus, also generation. 202 Second, because the Plan aims to reduce
CO2 emissions, coal’s generation share will decrease. Third, to
replace lost generation from coal, most models project that the
share of natural gas generation will increase and either exceed
coal or match it. Specifically, the EIA, EPA, EVA, NERA, and
Rhodium-CSIS models all project natural gas overcoming coal
generation, while NRDC’s model sees natural gas and coal
generation roughly equaling out over time. 203
The EPA’s model provides a good example of how these trends
may play out. In 2014, coal accounted for 39 percent of electricity
generation in the United States, while natural gas accounted for
27 percent. 204 Under the business-as-usual projection in EPA’s
198. E.g., VACLAV SMIL, ENERGY AT THE CROSSROADS : G LOBAL
PERSPECTIVES AND UNCERTAINTIES 121 (2003) (“[M]ore than 100 years of
long-term forecasts of energy affairs . . . have, save for a few proverbial
exceptions confirming the rule, a manifest record of failure.”).
199. Id. at 3–25; see also Hopkins, supra note 143, at 1.
200. Hopkins, supra note 143, at 1.
201. Id. at 8.
202. Id.
203. Id., Analysis of the Clean Power Plan, supra note 188, at 87–91. AEE
did not address generation mix in their model.
204. U.S. Energy Information Administration, What is U.S. Electricity
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model, natural gas generation will increase to 31 percent of total
generation by 2030, or 1,400 TWh, while coal generation would
decline to almost the same share as natural gas, at 32 percent, or
roughly 1,450 TWh. 205 Under the Clean Power Plan, however, the
EPA model predicts that natural gas generation will increase to 33
percent, or roughly 1,300 TWh, by 2030 under a rate-based
emissions goal. 206 Under a mass-based emissions goal, the EPA
predicts natural gas to increase its generation share to 32 percent,
or roughly 1,300 TWh. 207 Coal’s generation share would decline to
27 percent under both scenarios, or approximately 1,100 TWh. 208
The other models project similar overall trends, with natural
gas uniformly predicted to make greater inroads into coal’s overall
generation share under the CPP, as detailed in Figure 7. 209 NRDC,
for instance, projects that coal and natural gas generation will be
roughly equal in proportion by 2030 across all the model’s
scenarios, at roughly 23 percent each, or 1,100 TWh. 210 RhodiumCSIS’s model reaches comparable results. 211 NERA, on the other
hand, sees a less robust role for natural gas, with the resource
increasing to 29 percent of electricity generation, or roughly 1,300
TWh, in their unconstrained scenario, up slightly from 28 percent
in their model’s business-as-usual scenario. 212

Generation by Energy Source, www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=427&t=3 (last
visited Jan. 2, 2016).
205. Regulatory Impacts Analysis, supra note 189, at 3-28.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Hopkins, supra note 143, at 8.
210. NRDC Comment, supra note 192, at 8-24.
211. Rhodium-CSIS produced models with and without energy efficiency as
a compliance mechanism. In this model, natural gas generation rises to
roughly 1,300 TWh, or 34 percent of generation, when states utilize energy
efficiency, compared to nearly 1,200 TWh, or 27 percent, under the businessas-usual forecast. John Larsen et al., Remaking American Power National
Data
Table,
http://csis.org/files/publication/141118_National_Results_0.pdf
(last visited Jan. 10, 2016). Coal generation decreases to roughly 1,200 TWh,
or 30 percent of generation, consistent with projections suggesting that
natural gas generation overcomes a substantial amount of coal’s generation
share, compared to roughly 1,700 TWh or 39 percent under the business-asusual forecast. Id.
212. POTENTIAL ENERGY IMPACTS , supra note 194, at S-6. Under this
scenario, coal generation would decrease to 25 percent of generation, or
roughly 1,200 TWh.
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Figure 7: CPP Model Generation Share Projections 213
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Coal Baseline Projection
Natural Gas Baseline Projection

Coal CPP Projection
Natural Gas CPP Projection

EIA’s model predicts an initial spike in natural gas
generation, with an increase to 32 percent of electricity generation,
or roughly 1,400 TWh, by 2020—a large jump from their businessas-usual projection of 26 percent, or 1,100 TWh. 214
By 2040, however, EIA’s model projects natural gas
generation to decline to 29 percent, or roughly 1,450 TWh, down 2
percent from their business-as-usual projection of 31 percent, or
1,550 TWh. 215 EIA projects a steady decline in coal generation
throughout the compliance period. 216
Of course, the degree to which the use of natural gas for
electricity production will grow under the Clean Power Plan
depends on which strategies states use to reduce CO 2 emissions. In
this regard, each of the models assumes that states will rely on
energy efficiency to some degree. The EPA assumed that all states
will achieve a level of energy efficiency performance achieved by
leading states, 217 and the other models followed EPA’s lead or
assumed a similar level of energy efficiency. 218
213. CPP projection shares noted herein refer to the end of each model’s
projection period. NRDC did not provide baseline shares for comparison, and
EVA did not provide generation shares in terms of TWh, so the table only
includes percentages.
214. ANALYSIS OF THE CLEAN POWER PLAN, supra note 188, at 87.
215. Id. at 91.
216. Id.
217. Regulatory Impacts Analysis, supra note 189, at 3-12.
218. See Envtl. Protection Agency, Regulatory Impacts for the Proposed
Carbon Pollution Guidelines for Existing Power Plants and Emission
Standards for Modified and Reconstructed Powe r Plants 3-14 (2014) (EPA
assumed a 1.5 percent incremental demand reduction rate); ENERGY MARKET
IMPACTS , supra note 191, at 13 (EVA did not provide a reduction rate, but
instead assumed 179 TWh in annual energy efficiency savings, compared to
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Because states might not necessarily adopt energy efficiency
strategies, however, the Rhodium-CSIS, NRDC, and NERA,
models included sensitivity scenarios where efficiency measures
were either unavailable or extremely limited. 219 Under these
scenarios, coal-to-gas switching is expected to become the
predominant CPP compliance mechanism. 220 Thus, these scenarios
highlight the large role that natural gas is likely to play if states
do not employ—or do not receive credit for—energy efficiency
measures under the Clean Power Plan.
NRDC performed a sensitivity analysis in which states and
utilities take advantage of only half of available energy efficiency
gains.221 Under this scenario, coal’s generation share would fall to
24 percent, or roughly 1,000 TWh, while natural gas generation
would account for 29 percent of total electricity generation, or
approximately 1,300 TWh—a 7 percent gain for gas over NRDC’s
scenario where states utilize energy efficiency.222 This effect is
accentuated even more under NERA’s sensitivity analysis
constraining use of renewables and eliminating energy efficiency
measures. 223 In that scenario, coal’s generation share would
decline to roughly 4 percent of total generation, or 200 TWh, by
2030, while natural gas would increase its share to 57 percent, or
approximately 2,500 TWh. 224
EPA’s assumption of 119 TWh); Potential Energy Impacts, supra note 194, at
12 (NERA assumed the quantities of energy efficiency that the EPA assumed
in its model of the proposed rule); NRDC Comment, supra note 192, at 8-2
(NRDC assumed energy efficiency levels on the basis of the performance of
leading state programs); REMAKING AMERICAN POWER, supra note 197, at 18
(Rhodium-CSIS relied on EPA’s energy efficiency assumptions); see generally
ANALYSIS OF THE CLEAN POWER PLAN, supra note 188 (EIA contracted to
obtain information about current energy efficiency programs to develop their
assumptions). Although the models relied on the EPA’s energy efficiency levels
contained in their model of the proposed rule, the EPA decreased the energy
efficiency levels used in its model of the final rule by 0.5 percent points, to 1
percent. See Regulatory Impacts Analysis, supra note 189, at 3-13.
219. See REMAKING AMERICAN POWER, supra note 197, at 18; NRDC
Comment, supra note 192, at Appendix 8A-1; Potential Energy Impacts, supra
note 194, at S-6.
220. See REMAKING AMERICAN POwer, supra note 197, at 18; NRDC
Comment, supra note 192, at Appendix 8A-1; Potential Energy Impacts, supra
note 194, at S-6.
221. NRDC Comment, supra note 192, at 8-2.
222. See id. at 8-24; Appendix 8A-5.
223. Potential Energy Impacts, supra note 194, at S-6.
224. See id. at 19. Rhodium-CSIS projects similar changes in generation
shares under a scenario with no energy efficiency. Natural gas generation
rises to roughly 1,800 TWh, or 43 percent of total generation, while coal’s
generation share declines to roughly 900 TWh, or 21 percent of total
generation. These shifts compare to 27 percent for gas and 39 percent for coal
under the business-as-usual forecast, respectively. REMAKING AMERICAN
POWER, supra note 197.
EVA’s model only includes projections to 2020, but EVA also predicts that
natural gas will overcome a substantial amount of coal’s generation share.
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EIA’s sensitivity analysis assumed an increased availability
of natural gas and low Henry Hub prices. 225 EIA projects an
increase in natural gas’s generation share when Henry Hub prices
fall. Contrary to the normal policy scenario, EIA does not project a
tapering-off effect over the course of the compliance period. 226
Under its sensitivity analysis, natural gas’s generation share
steadily rises from 37 percent in 2020, or roughly 1,300 TWh, to 47
percent in 2040, roughly 2,400 TWh. 227 These CPP model
sensitivity projections are summarized in Figure 8.

Figure 8: Generation Share Sensitivity Projections
60%
50%
40%

30%
20%
10%

0%
Rhodium-CSIS

NERA

EIA

NRDC

Coal CPP Projection

Coal Sensitivity Projection

Natural Gas CPP Projection

Natural Gas Sensitivity Projection

Importantly, the models also acknowledge that the CPP’s
impact on the electricity sector will not be nationally uniform. 228

EVA projects natural gas to increase its generation share by 16 percent, from
29 percent under the business-as-usual case to 45 percent under the CPP. Coal
decreases its generation share by 17 percent, from 39 percent under the
business-as-usual case to 22 percent under the CPP. ENERGY MARKET
IMPACTS , supra note 191, at 23.
225. Analysis of the Clean Power Plan, supra note 188, at 12.
226. Id. at 93.
227. Id.
228. NRDC and the EPA did not conduct regional model breakdowns.
Rhodium-CSIS modeled national cooperation and regional fragmentation but
did not include projections for specific regions. See Remaking American Power,
supra note 197, at 15. EVA conducted a generation breakdown mix for each
state rather than focusing on regions. See Energy Market Impacts, supra note
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This has important implications for the role of natural gas under
the CPP, as the models show varying levels of increased natural
gas use for electricity production depending on the region. For
example, AEE projects natural gas consumption will increase
predominantly in the South and Midwest through 2020, 229 chiefly
because these are the regions where they expect the majority of
coal-retirements to occur. 230 However, AEE’s model suggests that
lower overall electricity consumption in the Mid-Atlantic,
Northeast, and the West will offset the increases in the South and
Midwest by 2030. 231 NERA projects natural gas consumption will
increase the Southeast, North Central, and South Central regions
from 2017 to 2031, comporting with their projections of greater
coal retirement in those regions. 232 NERA also projects decreased
natural gas consumption in the Northeast, East Central, and
West. 233 Consequently, by 2030, reduced electricity consumption in
these geographic regions would result in a net decrease in natural
gas consumption by the power sector as a whole. 234
2.

Natural Gas Demand and Price Trends

The Clean Power Plan will not just affect how natural gas is
used for electricity generation. It will also influence the natural
gas market itself, including demand, production, and price. Three
of the models make numerical demand projections, and all but one
include Henry Hub gas price projections. 235
Consistent with the models’ prediction that electricity
production from natural gas will initially increase through 2025
but then decrease through 2030, 236 they suggest that natural gas
demand and production will follow a similar trend. AEE, for
instance, predicts that natural gas demand will initially grow as a
result of expected coal-to-gas switching, but then decline over time
as renewables and demand-side resources flourish. 237 Specifically,
AEE’s model, which assumes a mix of resources used to achieve
191, at 24–25.
229. Impacts of the Clean Power Plan, supra note 150, at 10.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Potential Energy Impacts, supra note 194, at B-7.
233. Id.
234. Id. EIA’s model attributes natural gas trends to the degree of
renewable penetration in various regions. Analysis of the Clean Power Plan,
supra note 188, at 54. In Florida, the Great Lakes, and the Virginia-Carolina
regions, EIA expects renewables to make greater inroads, and consequently
projects slow or declining growth in natural gas generation. Id. On par with
AEE’s and NERA’s projections, EIA expects greater natural gas generation in
the South, specifically Texas and the Mississippi, due to lagging renewable
development in this region. Id.
235. AEE did not include natural gas price projections in their model.
236. See Hopkins, supra note 143, at 8.
237. See Impacts of the Clean Power Plan, supra note 150, at ii.
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CPP compliance, sees natural demand growing to 3.9 Bcfd above
the business-as-usual case through 2020, but decreasing to 0.7
Bcfd lower than the business-as-usual scenario by 2030. 238 EVA’s
model only forecasts through 2020, but likewise predicts demand
growth for natural gas in that period,239 specifically, an increase of
6.4 Bcfd from 2012 levels by 2020. 240 Finally, Rhodium-CSIS’s
model averages growth rather than creating individual time-span
breakdowns, 241 but it also predicts an increase in natural gas
demand from 2020 to 2030, in a range from 3.1 to 10.9 Bcfd across
four scenarios. 242
The models also predict that the initial increase in natural
gas generation and demand will cause natural gas prices to rise.
The EPA, EVA, NERA, NRDC, and Rhodium-CSIS rate-based
models all project an increase in natural gas prices ranging from
$5.36 to $6.62 per MMBtu by 2030, 243 compared to business-asusual prices ranging from $4.60 to $6.01 per MMBtu. 244 However,
EPA projects natural gas prices to fall below their business-asusual level of $6.01 per MMBtu to $5.92 per MMBtu under their
mass-based goal scenario. 245 EIA’s projections to 2040 suggest that
prices could rise to $8.15 per MMBtu, compared to their businessas-usual forecast of $7.85 MMBtu. 246 The models that conducted
sensitivity analyses with limited or no energy efficiency measures
projected even greater increases in natural gas prices, ranging

238. Id. at 7-9.
239. Energy Market Impacts, supra note 191, at 33.
240. Id. at 34. EVA did not provide a business-as-usual model for natural
gas demand, but instead compared their projections to 2012 levels. Id.
241. REMAKING AMERICAN POWER, supra note 197, at 34.
242. Id. at 32. Rhodium-CSIS’s inclusion of their sensitivity scenarios
contributes in part to their large range of demand increase. See id. RhodiumCSIS explains that demand is approximately three times higher without
energy efficiency. See id.
243. See Regulatory Impacts Analysis, supra note 189, at 3-35 (EPA
predicts gas prices to rise to $6.21 per MMBtu, a 3.3 percent increase above
their business-as-usual price of $6.01 MMBtu); E NERGY MARKET IMPACTS ,
supra note 191, at 34 (EVA predicts an increase to $6.62 MMBtu. EVA does
not use a business-as-usual model for comparison, but instead compares gas
prices to the 2012 amount of $2.82 per MMBtu); POTENTIAL ENERGY IMPACTS ,
supra note 194, at S-6 (under NERA’s unconstrained scenario, gas prices rise
to $5.36, a 2 percent increase from their business-as-usual forecast); NRDC
Comment, supra note 192, at 8-19 (across their scenarios, NRDC predicts
prices to rise to an average of $5.90 per MMBtu, compared to their businessas-usual forecast of $5.6 MMBtu); REMAKING AMERICAN POWER, supra note
197 (under their unconstrained scenario, Rhodium-CSIS predicts prices to rise
to $5.33 per MMBtu, a 1 percent increase above their business-as-usual
forecast of $5.27 per MMBtu).
244. Id. EVA did not provide a business-as-usual model for natural gas
prices, but instead compared their projections to the 2012 prices of $2.82 per
MMBtu. See ENERGY MARKET IMPACTS , supra note 191, at 34.
245. Regulatory Impacts Analysis, supra note 189, at 3-35.
246. Analysis of the Clean Power Plan, supra note 188, at 92.
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from $5.73 to $6.78 per MMBtu, compared to business-as-usual
prices ranging from $4.60 to $6.01 per MMBtu. 247
Thus, the models suggest that the extent to which states rely
on energy efficiency for CPP compliance will be critical. That
choice will impact not just the mix of generation resources used to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions but also national gas prices and
demand.
Table B: Henry Hub Price Projections (per MMBtu)
Businessas-Usual

Model

Clean
Power Plan
Projection

Percent
Change

Sensitivity
Analysis

Percent
Change

+3.3%

-

-

EPA Rate-Based

$6.01

$6.21

EPA Mass-Based

$6.01

$5.92

-1.5%

-

-

EIA

$7.85

$8.15

+3.8%

-

-

$6.62

-

-

-

EVA

$2.82
(2012
Henry Hub)

NERA

$5.25

$5.36

+2.0%

$6.78

+29.0%

NRDC

$5.60

$5.90

+5.3%

$6.10

+9.0%

Rhodium-CSIS

$5.27

$5.33

+1.0%

$5.73

+9.0%

3.

Natural Gas Infrastructure

Although the models suggest that the role of natural gas will
grow over the next decade, they do not predict that the Clean
Power Plan will require large increases in natural gas
infrastructure. In recent years, the natural gas industry has
rapidly added incremental infrastructure to accommodate growing
production volumes. 248 The models generally show that the current
trajectory of natural gas infrastructure growth should be adequate
to compensate for additional fuel demand under the CPP. 249
247. See Potential Energy Impacts, supra note 194, at S-6 (under NERA’s
constrained scenario with no energy efficiency available, prices rise to $6.78
per MMBtu, 29 percent above their business-as-usual forecast); NRDC
Comment, supra note 192, at 8B-6 (NRDC’s constrained scenario projects with
only half of energy efficiency measures available projects gas prices to rise to
$6.10 per MMBtu, 9 percent above their business-as-usual forecast);
REMAKING AMERICAN POWER, supra note 197 (under Rhodium-CSIS’s
constrained scenario with no energy efficiency available, prices rise to $5.73
per MMBtu, 9 percent above their business as usual forecast). Note that no
figure is shown in the Percent Change column of Table B for the EVA model
because that model reported 2012 Henry Hub prices rather than a businessas-usual projection.
248. Impacts of the Clean Power Plan, supra note 150, at 4.
249. Id. at 5. Only the EPA and AEE models contain projections
concerning
natural
gas
infrastructure.
Rhodium-CSIS
addresses
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Because the models project an overall decline in generation
and consumption, they do not foresee large infrastructure
increases as necessary. 250 For instance, under AEE’s business-asusual scenario, investments of approximately $47 billion in
infrastructure would be necessary to support the continued growth
of natural gas supply and demand by 2030. 251 By contrast, AEE
projects only an additional 4 percent in expenditures for pipeline
expansion beyond business-as-usual expenditures between 2016
and 2020, and no incremental requirement beyond the businessas-usual forecast after 2020. 252 In a scenario with unusually low
gas prices, which would likely drive increased gas use, the AEE
model predicts a 6 percent increase in infrastructure expenditures
by 2020 and another 8 percent increase by 2030. 253 The EPA
forecasts an even lower need for infrastructure increases—less
than two percent by 2020. 254
Overall, then, the models do not project that the Clean Power
Plan will transform the natural gas market. Because the EPA
included coal-to-gas switching as a compliance mechanism within
the Plan, natural gas is expected to make inroads into coal’s
overall generation share. Critically, however, whether and how
states choose to adopt energy efficiency strategies to meet the
CPP’s mandate will heavily influence the degree to which the Plan
drives further gas use. If efficiency is utilized, the models suggest
that natural gas use will grow initially but level off or decline by
2030. But if states do not rely on efficiency, natural gas’s role may
be more prominent.

IV. COMPETING V ISIONS: THE ROLE OF NATURAL GAS
IN E LECTRICITY’S FUTURE
As the spotlight has shone brighter and brighter on natural gas
in recent years, competing visions of the fuel have emerged. Just as
natural gas was once seen as a nuisance byproduct that was more
problematic that beneficial, only to quickly become not merely a

infrastructure impacts in their model, but does not provide detailed numerical
forecasts. Specifically, this model provides data on current infrastructure
needs under a business-as-usual forecast, and observes that the “CPP will
require a greater need for many types of infrastructure, not just natural gas
infrastructure.” REMAKING AMERICAN POWER, supra note 197, at 44.
250. Impacts of the Clean Power Plan, supra note 150, at 9; see also
Regulatory Impacts Analysis, supra note 189, at 3-35.
251. Impacts of the Clean Power Plan, supra note 150, at 8.
252. Id. at 10. AEE points out that these projected increases fall within the
range of historical expansion of natural gas infrastructure, and the required
additions under the Clean Power Plan are less than additions that occurred in
the past ten years. Id. at 12.
253. Id. at 10–11.
254. Regulatory Impacts Analysis, supra note 189, at 3-35.
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relevant energy source but a key one, a war of public opinion is
waging today over how to see natural gas anew.
The visions are diametrically opposed. On one hand, many
observers suggest that natural gas may be a “bridge” to a clean
energy future—that is, a stopgap measure that would immediately
reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help ease the nation into
greater reliance on near- or effectively zero-carbon resources such
as renewables and nuclear. 255 On the other hand, some urge that
natural gas is hardly a bridge, but rather, a “gangplank” or a
“dead end”—that is, a short-sighted empty promise that will not
solve our climate change woes but only further entrench the nation
in a destructive, fossil fuel-dependent path. 256
Not only are these visions in tension, they are both primarily
about electricity. The very premise of a natural gas bridge hinges
on the notion that gas will replace coal in the generation fleet, 257
although gas of course could be used to displace oil in the vehicle
fleet as well. 258 The likely impact of the Clean Power Plan is thus
potentially relevant to whether gas will be a bridge or a dead end.
That rule, as detailed above, may heavily influence how much and
in what ways the nation uses gas. And, those choices may well
drive whether greater reliance on gas for electricity production
offers a transition to a new and different energy future, or whether
it locks us into one already quite familiar.
To begin untangling these thorny questions, this Part first
describes each of the competing visions of natural gas’s future. It
then briefly explores possibilities of how the Clean Power Plan
may push in either direction.

255. See, e.g., John Podesta & Timothy E. Wirth, Natural Gas: A Bridge
Fuel for the 21st Century, Center for American Progress (Aug. 10, 2009),
www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/report/2009/08/10/6513/natural-gas-abridge-fuel-for-the-21st-century/.
256. Yuill Herbert, Natural Gas: A Bridge or a Gangplank, A Submission
to the Independent Hydraulic Fracturing Review on the Issue of Climate
Change (Apr. 27, 2014), www.ssg.coop/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/140207_Hydraulic-Fracking-submission-Final.pdf; see also Brad Plumer, Obama Says
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A. A Bridge?
On its surface, the metaphor that natural gas can serve as a
“bridge” is straightforward. The suggestion is that by switching
from coal, which is CO2 intensive, to gas, which is both cleaner
burning and less CO2-intensive, producing more electricity from
gas is a first step toward reducing climate emissions. As one set of
observers has summarized, because natural gas’s CO 2 emissions
are “about 45 percent lower per Btu than coal and 30 percent
lower than oil, its apparent abundance raises the possibility that
[it] could serve as a bridge fuel . . . . Such a transition would seem
particularly attractive in the electric power sector if natural gas
were to displace coal.”259
Yet looking beneath the surface reveals a more complex path
for gas than the simple suggestion that it can be a “bridge.” One
question is how long the bridge will be. If it is short, the natural
gas bridge could in fact facilitate a shift to the clean energy
economy for which many commentators clamor. 260 Many observers,
however, have opined that the bridge will not be short at all. As
Professor Pierce has suggested, “[T]he natural gas bridge to
carbon-free fuels is likely to be extremely long, at least decades
and probably a century.”261
There are good reasons for such prognostications. Gas
appears quite abundant, particularly in light of the shale boom. 262
It has become increasingly inexpensive, driven by greater
supplies. 263 It is extraordinarily nimble as a fuel, as its own history
makes clear. And in the electricity sector, it remains less
expensive—and arguably more valuable in terms of its quick
dispatchability
and
load-following
abilities—than
many
renewables and other alternatives, such as nuclear power. 264
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RFF Issue Brief 09-11, 1 (Dec. 2009).
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In that light, another question is, “Where does the natural gas
bridge lead?”265 Conventionally, the assumption is that the bridge
will take society to a low- or zero-carbon destination. Of course,
that is not necessarily the case, and the degree to which gas will
help reduce greenhouse gas emissions depends on what other
resources are used along with it—or are used to replace it. If, for
instance, the natural gas bridge is a road to simply more gas, that
destination may promise a better energy future than business as
usual, but it is also unlikely to offer a kind of clean energy
panacea. 266
Thus, one analyst has assessed different bridge scenarios for
natural gas. 267 In one version, a truly short bridge, natural gas use
would peak between 2020 and 2030. If this were the case, CO 2
concentrations could also peak at 450 parts per million, perhaps
allowing the world to keep global temperature growth below 2
degrees Celsius. 268 If the bridge lasted longer—if, for example,
natural gas use peaked between 2020 and 2060—CO2
concentrations might top out at 550 parts per million, and the
chance would be significant that the 2 degree Celsius threshold
would be breached. 269 Importantly, however, either bridge scenario
would offer a substantial improvement on a situation where gas
simply replaced coal and failed to incent a broader energy
transition. In that case, the International Energy Agency has
estimated that CO2 concentrations would rise to 650 parts per
million and global temperatures would increase by more than 3.5
degrees Celsius. 270
Still, utilizing natural gas as a bridge may offer benefits of its
own. Even if it cannot be used to encourage greater reliance on
renewables and other effectively zero-carbon resources, a gas
bridge may help the world transition away from coal. As Michael
Levi has observed, “it may be useful to think of a natural gas
bridge as a potential hedging tool against the possibility that it
will be more difficult to move away from coal than policymakers
desire or can achieve, rather than merely (or primarily) as a way
to achieve particular desired temperature outcomes.” 271
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B. A Dead End?
The contrary version of natural gas’s future is much drearier
than the bridge view. In this metaphor, if increasing the nation’s
(or the world’s) reliance on natural gas fails to adequately reduce
CO2 emissions, the natural gas bridge might become “a bridge to
nowhere.”272 Or, in starker terms: A natural gas bridge that fails
to deliver society to a clean energy economy is simply a “dead
end.”273
Suggestions that expanding natural gas use might not solve
climate change are not based in fantasy. Some research has
suggested that prior estimates of leaks in the natural gas
system—both from wellhead to burner tip and in the initial
extraction and closing phases of gas mining—drastically
undervalue how much methane is being released into the
atmosphere from gas use. 274
Once that point is established, the argument against natural
gas as a bridge fuel is an easy syllogism. Methane—the primary
component of natural gas—is a far more powerful greenhouse gas
than carbon dioxide. 275 Too much methane in the atmosphere thus
can heat the planet far more quickly than can CO 2. And, while
methane also dissipates much more quickly than CO 2 (on the order
of decades rather than centuries), 276 the planet is in imminent
enough danger that any delay in reducing climate change
emissions cannot be tolerated. 277 As Richard Howarth contends,
“At best, using natural gas rather than coal to generate electricity
might result in a very modest reduction in total greenhouse gas
emissions, if those emissions can be kept below a range of 2.4–
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3.2% . . . . That is a big ‘if,’ and one that will require
unprecedented investment in natural gas infrastructure and
regulatory oversight.”278
Another reason to think that natural gas might be a dead end
rather than a bridge is path-dependence. Energy infrastructure is
expensive, and notoriously difficult to plan, site, and construct. 279
Thus, if expanding gas use also requires significantly building out
the fuel’s infrastructure, it could be difficult for society to move
away from continued use of those facilities in the future. After all,
a core premise of U.S. energy law and policy is keeping prices as
low as possible, 280 and energy history is littered with lengthy and
costly battles over “stranded costs” as energy systems move from
one regulatory regime to another. 281 It is not unreasonable to
worry that past may again be prologue.
For these reasons, some observers have suggested that if the
nation seeks to use natural gas as a bridge fuel, perhaps the
bridge needs “guardrails.”282 Such guardrails might include
limiting electricity demand growth; managing and reducing
methane leakage; using the gas bridge primarily to eliminate coal
use in the electricity sector rather than replacing other fuels with
gas; and ensuring that greater gas use does not lock out effectively
zero-carbon energy sources such as renewables. 283
The possible need for guardrails on the bridge, moreover,
underscores a broader point. The “bridge” and “dead end”
metaphors are catchy and easy to grasp, which may help explain
why they have received so much play. Yet truth rarely lies at polar
opposites; rather, it is often found somewhere in between. That
may be the case for natural gas as well, as the ultimate effect of
switching heavily to it to reduce climate emissions may be more
complex than either vision of gas’s future lets on. As Chris Busch
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and Eric Gimon have noted, “[W]hen there are opportunities to
substitute for coal power on the margin, looking at GHG emissions
alone, it likely makes sense under a wide range of circumstances
. . . . Significant leakage in the methane system may not
completely eliminate the GHG benefit of new gas over coal, but it
will erode the relative climate benefit of natural gas as a GHG
mitigation option.”284
Such measured statements carry less panache than analogies
to bridges, gangplanks, and dead ends. Ultimately, however, they
may be more reflective of likely reality than any scenario
suggesting a certain outcome one way or the other.

C. The Path of the Clean Power Plan
In the context of the bridge/dead-end dichotomy, the position
of the Clean Power Plan is perhaps less clear than one might
initially assume. The Plan expressly includes coal-to-gas switching
as a mitigation technique, which might suggest that the EPA sees
the Plan as a way to facilitate using natural gas as a bridge fuel. At
the same time, the Plan also specifically contemplates other
compliance mechanisms, including more efficient use of coal-fired
powerplants and displacement of CO2-emitting facilities with lowand effectively zero-carbon renewables. 285 And, EPA has made it
clear that states are not bound to only these options but can also
use other alternatives to reduce CO2 emissions, including efficiency
measures and greater reliance on nuclear energy. 286 Thus, it is not
obvious that the Plan views gas as a bridge fuel per se.
What is obvious is that the Plan leaves much up to the states
to determine how they will meet its emissions reduction targets.
The extensive modeling of the Plan’s possible impacts makes this
abundantly clear. In scenarios where energy efficiency plays a key
role in compliance, the importance of natural gas is significantly
reduced under the Plan. 287 And, of course, the Plan’s impacts may
differ regionally, with areas that today rely on coal perhaps also
being most inclined to switch most heavily to gas. 288 Thus, it is
possible that gas may be treated as a bridge in some states but not
others.
If gas is a bridge under the Clean Power Plan, it appears
designed to be a short one. In general, the models agree that while
natural gas use should increase under the Plan, that trend will
either level off or dissipate by 2030. For example, AEE projects an
initial growth in demand above the business-as-usual case through
284. Chris Busch & Eric Gimon, Natural Gas Versus Coal: Is Natural Gas
Better for the Climate?, 27 ELECTRICITY J. 97, 110 (2014).
285. See supra Part III.A.
286. See id.
287. See supra Part III.B.
288. See id.
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2020, but an eventual decrease below business-as-usual forecasts
by 2030. 289 In fact, one of the models suggests that natural gas will
not play a heavy role in Plan compliance at all, with natural gas’s
generation share growing just one percent above business-as-usual
projections by 2030. 290 In any case, no matter which of these
scenarios might play out, the models agree that any gas bridge will
be a relatively short one—certainly much shorter than the
decades- or century-long bridge some observers have suggested
could be the case. 291
Further underscoring the idea that a gas bridge under the
Clean Power Plan will be short are the models’ predictions that
substantial gas infrastructure investment will not be necessary to
accommodate the Plan. While the models do suggest that the Plan
will incent some additional infrastructure investment—on the
order of 2 to 8 percent more than business-as-usual292—this is
hardly the kind of additional investment that will lock the nation
into significantly expanded gas use over the next hundred years.
In fact, what the models suggest is that other factors are already
driving up gas infrastructure investment, namely, the shale gas
revolution—a revolution that was already taking place
notwithstanding the Clean Power Plan’s adoption, and that will
almost certainly continue irrespective of whether the Plan is
upheld in court. If one thing is true in energy history, it is that
price reigns. Thus, the availability (or unavailability) of cheap gas
ultimately may have more sway over whether there is a gas bridge
(or how long it is) than will the Plan itself. 293
To at least some degree, the various models of the Clean
Power Plan should thus allay concerns that the Plan will create a
gas bridge to nowhere, or lead to a dead end. The models do not
suggest that the Plan will necessarily build a bridge, that the
bridge will exist throughout the United States, or that it will be
long. Gas may well play an important role in achieving Plan
compliance, but its role may be short-lived, and will certainly be
impacted by other factors, including energy efficiency and gas
prices, as well.
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Admittedly, energy modeling is notoriously unreliable, so
these forecasts of the Plan’s likely impacts must be taken with
some caution. Nonetheless, the core point they highlight has
strong basis in both logic and history. The role of natural gas in
the Clean Power Plan, just as has been true for the role of gas in
society historically, is difficult to predict—and almost certainly
will be less simple than complex going forward.

V. CONCLUSION
Over time, natural gas has played many roles in society.
Sometimes, these roles have conflicted—such as in the 1800s when
gas was both an emerging competitor in the illumination business
but was also widely treated as a nuisance byproduct. Often, these
roles have evolved, many times quite quickly—such as in the early
1900s when gas switched from a lighting source to a home heating
fuel, or in the 1970s when Congress declared it off-limits for new
electricity generation facilities, only to reverse that decision a
decade later.
Today, natural gas is in another period of change. The shale
gas revolution has made gas more ubiquitous and more relevant
than ever, and in turn gas has cemented an even stronger position
as an electricity generation fuel than at any other time in its
history. The need to combat climate change makes gas’s prospects
as a generation fuel brighter still, at least in the short term when
gas could serve as a bridge fuel to a clean energy future. While the
bridge analogy is attractive, it also raises many questions, and has
caused significant consternation for some who believe that relying
more on natural gas will further entrench the nation in an
unsustainable fossil fuel economy.
A common view is that, under the Clean Power Plan rule,
assuming the rule survives legal challenge, gas will take on an
even greater role in electricity production, thus realizing its
“bridge” potential. What the models show, however, is that gas’s
role in the Clean Power Plan is likely to be more nuanced. That
role will depend heavily on what other approaches states decide to
adopt, with energy efficiency measures at the top of that list. Its
role also will be impacted by regionalism and gas prices, both of
which relate to the Clean Power Plan but are not necessarily
dictated by it. There is thus good reason to expect that under the
Clean Power Plan, the role of natural gas may grow, although the
models show that growth may be rather short-lived, leveling off or
receding near 2030.
Perhaps, then, the only thing that is certain for the future of
natural gas under the Clean Power Plan is the same thing that
has been true throughout the fuel’s history. Its role, over time, will
continue to shift, change, and evolve.
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